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1. Introduction
In 2006, the International Accounting Standards
Board (IASB), closely coordinated with the US
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB),
started a project with the purpose to fundamental-
ly review all aspects of its current rules for post-
employment benefit (pension) accounting. In
March 2008, the IASB published a discussion
paper (IASB, 2008a) that summarises tentative de-
cisions taken so far and considers further changes
to its standard IAS 19 Employee Benefits. More
precisely, the IASB has tentatively decided that
companies in the future will have to recognise
fully their net pension liabilities in their balance
sheets. All changes to pension assets and pension
liabilities will have to be recognised in the period
in which they occur. Thus, the planned revision of
the standard will abolish the current option for
companies to delay recognition of components of
their pension liabilities in the balance sheet and in
the income statement as long as they do not exceed
certain thresholds, the so-called ‘corridor ap-
proach’. The IASB has yet to decide on how com-
panies will be mandated to present the components
of the changes to pension assets and pension liabil-
ities in comprehensive income (see IASB, 2008a:
para. PV2-5).
Given the history of standard-setting in the area
of pension accounting, one can easily predict that
the IASB’s proposal will be controversial, both
conceptually and politically. Pension accounting
has caused controversies ever since standard-set-
ters started to regulate the recognition and valua-
tion of pension-related liabilities, assets, and costs.
For instance, in the US, both the Committee on
Accounting Procedures of the American Institute
of Certified Public Accountants in the 1950s and
its successor, the Accounting Principles Board, in
the 1960s had to concede that ‘improvements in
pension accounting were necessary beyond what
was considered practical at those times’ (FAS 87,
Summary). In the 1970s and 1980s, the FASB’s at-
tempt to introduce an accounting standard fully
based on the accrual principle again met with
strong resistance from the corporate sector
(Francis, 1987; Saeman, 1995; Klumpes, 2001).
Similarly, the deliberations of the International
Accounting Standard Committee (IASC) on a re-
vised version of IAS 19 in the 1990s also proved
to be contentious (Camfferman and Zeff, 2007).
Finally, when the UK Accounting Standards Board
(ASB) in 2000 published a new pension account-
ing standard that endorsed a strict requirement for
companies to recognise immediately and fully
their net pension liabilities in their balance sheets,
this again sparked off a heated debate during
which critics held the ASB’s standard responsible
for changes, or the termination, of corporate pen-
sion schemes (Chitty, 2002; Slater and Copeland,
2005).
There are several reasons why the accounting for
corporate pension systems causes so much contro-
versy. First, there has not always been a consensus
on the economic and legal nature of corporate pen-
sion promises and obligations (Klumpes, 2001;
Napier, 2007; Blake et al., 2008). Second, the na-
ture of corporate pension promises and obligations
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can be different in different regulatory environ-
ments. In addition, in many countries, regulation
on corporate pensions has evolved, and changed
substantially, over time (Whiteford and White-
house, 2006; Ebbinghaus, 2007; Barr, 2009).
Third, many companies have accumulated large
pension obligations. Changes to accounting stan-
dards can therefore profoundly influence their bal-
ance sheets and earnings. Fourth, estimating the
values of pension obligations is challenging be-
cause they tend to be long term and depend on
many financial and demographic factors. Because
of their long-term nature, small changes in as-
sumptions used to estimate pension obligation val-
ues can cause large changes in estimates. In fact,
one of the most critical aspects of pension account-
ing is how to account for the valuation effects of
changes in assumptions, so-called actuarial gains
or losses. Finally, corporate pension systems are
not only a matter of interest to company manage-
ment, shareholders, creditors, analysts, and other
capital-market participants, but also to millions of
employees whose well-being in retirement de-
pends on the occupational pension system. This
latter aspect has the potential to turn the account-
ing for pensions into a political issue (Klumpes,
1994; Saeman, 1995).
It can be argued that the debate about pension
accounting reflects the broader discussion about
the purpose and objective of accounting in general
(Fasshauer and Glaum, 2008). According to the
conceptual frameworks of IASB and FASB, the
primary objective of financial reporting is to pro-
vide decision-useful information to equity in-
vestors, creditors, and other users of financial
reporting.1 To promulgate accounting standards
that lead to decision-useful reporting, the two stan-
dard-setters for many years have been following
the so-called asset-liability approach which gives
precedence to the complete recognition and pre-
cise valuation of assets and liabilities in the bal-
ance sheet at the reporting date. Meanwhile, the
more traditional revenue-expense or income ap-
proach which focuses on the determination of an
informative, persistent earnings figure has taken
backstage. The orientation of the IASB and the
FASB towards the asset-liability approach, and the
far-reaching use of fair-value accounting that fol-
lows from it, is strongly contested. This also holds
in pension accounting. As in other areas of ac-
counting, the use of fair values for pension assets
and liabilities is subject to criticism because of the
uncertainty surrounding the estimations of such
values and because of the volatility they induce
into companies’ income statements and balance
sheets.
Thus, on various levels pension accounting ap-
pears to be entangled in discussions on complex
practical and conceptual issues. For this reason, it
is of great interest to ask which answers academic
research may be able to give in response to the
questions raised by standard-setters and other par-
ticipants in the on-going debate. It is the purpose
of this paper to provide a systematic review of re-
search on pension accounting. Systematic reviews
are useful because they accumulate and integrate
previous findings in a given field. In doing so, they
can help researchers to identify research questions,
to formulate hypotheses, to assess and refine mod-
els, and to become aware of methodological is-
sues. However, the present review should not only
be of interest to academics, but also to executives
who are responsible for preparing financial re-
ports, to analysts and investors who try to ascertain
the financial consequences of corporate pension
plans from published reports, and to standard-sett-
ters who need to decide how current pension re-
porting standards can be improved upon.
Since a companion paper by Napier (2009) will
address conceptual issues in the accounting for
pensions, in conducting this review I will concen-
trate on empirical research. However, in my re-
view, I will not cover research on tax accounting,2
nor work on the funding of pensions.3
Furthermore, it is sometimes claimed that changes
in the accounting for pensions can have repercus-
sions on the way occupational pension schemes
are set up and run by companies. The question
whether such claims have merit is addressed in an-
other companion paper by Kiosse and Peasnell
(2009). For this reason, studies that address the in-
fluence of accounting on changes in corporate pen-
sion provision, i.e. on pension plan closures or
conversions, and on pension asset allocation, will
not be within the scope of this review.
Empirical research on pension accounting has
focused on two issues, which are, however, inter-
related: the value-relevance of pension accounting
information, and earnings management in pension
accounting. Further work has been done on the in-
formation efficiency of capital markets with regard
to pension accounting information. I will outline
how research in these areas has evolved over the
past two to three decades and discuss the results
that have been obtained. Furthermore, I will point
out that almost all existing studies on pension ac-
counting are based on US accounting and capital-
market data. Given that pension systems, as well
as other important aspects of legal and financial
systems, differ markedly across countries, it needs
274 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
1 See SFAC 1 (FASB, 1978), para. 34; IASC Framework
(IASC, 1989), para. 10; IASB, 2008b, para. OB2.
2 On the taxation of corporate pensions, e.g. Black (1980),
Tepper (1981), Thomas (1988), Frank (2002).
3 On the funding of pensions, see, e.g. Sharpe (1976),
Treynor (1977), Tepper (1981), Feldstein and Seligman
(1981), Francis and Reiter (1987), Ippolito (2001), Rauh
(2006), Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2008).
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to be discussed to which degree the US findings
can be generalised.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next sec-
tion (Section 2), I provide a brief overview of in-
stitutional forms of corporate pension plans. In
Section 3, I summarise the main conceptual issues
in the accounting for pensions and explain how in-
ternational pension accounting standards deal with
these issues. Sections 2 and 3 are to provide the
necessary institutional and conceptual background
for the subsequent sections on empirical research.
In Section 4, the core section of the paper, I pres-
ent and discuss the extant empirical literature on
pension accounting. In Section 5, I return to the
above-mentioned fact that existing empirical re-
search on pension accounting is focused on the US
pension and capital market system. To explore this
issue further, I highlight important differences be-
tween the pension systems of the US and select
European countries and discuss which issues these
differences raise for empirical research. The paper
closes with a short summary and an outlook for
further research.
2. Corporate pension schemes
As noted above, there has not always been a con-
sensus on the nature of pension promises and
claims. Until the 1960s or 1970s, in the US, the
UK, and in other countries, pension payments
were often regarded as voluntary, gratuitous pay-
ments by companies to loyal employees (Napier,
2007; Blake et al., 2008). Obviously, viewing cor-
porate pensions in such a way has important impli-
cations for their accounting. For instance, if
pension payments are voluntary, i.e. if companies
are free to terminate such payments at any time,
they cannot give rise to liabilities. Instead, it then
appears consistent to account for pension pay-
ments on a cash basis, as was the practice until the
introduction of accrual-based standards in the
1980s.
The discussion on the nature of corporate pen-
sions has evolved over time, as has legislation and
regulation in many countries (Ebbinghaus, 2007).
As a consequence, today it appears widely accept-
ed to view pensions as a form of deferred compen-
sation (PAAinE, 2008). Based on contracts, and
often encouraged by tax incentives, employees
agree to temporarily forego part of the remunera-
tion owed to them for services rendered in a given
period, in exchange for a promise to receive pen-
sion payments in later periods, usually after retire-
ment.4 Pension obligations are thus as a form of
debt, owed by the company, or a third party on be-
half of the company, to the employees. Viewing
pensions as deferred compensation directly leads
to the need for accrual accounting. Claims to fu-
ture pension payments that are earned by employ-
ees for the services they provide are part of a
company’s labour cost in any given period, and
employees’ already accumulated pension claims
are a liability (Blake et al., 2008).
Pension arrangements between companies and
employers can take many forms. Traditionally, the
literature distinguishes defined contribution and
defined benefit plans. With a defined contribution
plan, companies promise to pay regular contribu-
tions into accounts held for participating employ-
ees. The amount accrued in a pension account at
retirement is then usually used to pay a lifelong an-
nuity to the employee, possibly followed by pay-
ments to surviving relatives. The amounts of
future pension payments depend on the contribu-
tions paid in by the employer, and on the returns
earned by the contributions over time. In a pure
defined contribution pension scheme, the employ-
er has no legal or constructive obligation beyond
the regular contributions; in particular, it does not
guarantee the amounts of future pension payments.
In practice, defined contribution plans often 
involve arrangements with external pension
providers such as insurance companies. The em-
ploying company sponsors the pension plan, i.e. it
commits itself to regular contributions, but the ob-
ligation for the future pension payments lies with
the insurance company who manages the fund. In
such schemes, it thus is the insurance company
who has a liability towards the employees, not the
employer.
In a defined benefit plan, the company promises
to make pension payments to employees after their
retirement. The amounts of the promised future
pension payments depend on the precise contrac-
tual arrangement between the company and the
employees, the ‘benefit formula’. Usually the
amounts depend on the years of service the em-
ployees render, and on their compensation levels
in the years immediately before retirement (career-
end salary plans), or on average compensation lev-
els during their careers (career-average salary
plans). With defined benefit plans, it is the compa-
ny, not the employees, or a third-party insurance
company, that bears the financial and the longevi-
ty risks of the scheme.
In practice, pension arrangements can combine
elements of pure defined contribution and defined
benefit pension schemes (hybrid pension plans)
(Wesbroom and Reay, 2005). For instance, defined
contribution pension plans are often combined
with minimum guarantees on the investment re-
turns on the contributions.5 Furthermore, there can
be multi-employer pension plans where two or
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 275
4 See McCarthy (2006) for a discussion of occupational
pensions from an economics point of view.
5 Accounting issues pertaining to hybrid pension schemes
are addressed in the current IASB discussion paper; see IASB,
2008a, ch. 4.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:04
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
more companies, sometimes all companies in a
sector, jointly sponsor a pension scheme.6
The prevalence of pension plans differs across
countries. For instance, in the US and in the UK
voluntary occupational pension schemes are wide-
spread, and both defined contribution and defined
benefit pension plans have traditionally been used.
However, the usage of defined benefit plans has
diminished in recent years (Munnell, 2006). In
Continental Europe, the picture is heterogeneous.
In some countries, occupational pensions do not
play much of a role (e.g. Italy). In other countries,
pension plans are common, either on a voluntary
basis (e.g. Germany), or due to collective industri-
al-relations agreements (e.g. the Netherlands), or
because of legal requirements (e.g. Switzerland).
At a later point of the paper (Section 5), I will re-
turn to the differences between national pension
systems and their possible implications for empir-
ical research on pension accounting.
An important aspect of pension schemes is their
funding. One can distinguish between funded and
unfunded schemes. With funded schemes, assets –
so-called plan assets which are intended to finance
the future pension payments – are set aside, either
by the sponsoring company itself or by a third
party on its behalf. For defined contribution plans
involving external pension providers, this is
achieved through the sponsoring company’s regu-
lar payments and their reinvestment.7 For defined
benefit plans, companies may or may not set aside
plan assets. If a company does not (fully) fund its
pension obligations, future pension payments have
to be financed from the company’s cash flow when
they are due (pay-as-you-go schemes). In some
countries, at least a minimum level of funding of
pension plans is legally required. However, it is
important to note that funding does not relieve the
company from its obligations towards the benefi-
ciaries of the plan. If the plan assets do not suffice
to pay for the defined benefits, the company is re-
quired to make up the deficit (McGill et al., 2005).
For the accounting, funding of pension obligations
raises the question of how plan assets should be
accounted for. In addition, if plan assets are held
by separate legal units, it must to be decided
whether the sponsoring company is required to
consolidate these entities.
Funding practices differ across countries
(Orszag and Sand, 2006). As mentioned, in some
countries minimum or full funding is required by
law (e.g. in the US, the UK, and in the Netherlands),
and companies in these countries therefore typical-
ly have high funding ratios. In other countries (e.g.
in Germany), funding is not mandatory and com-
panies may therefore have little or no plan assets at
all. In Section 5 of the paper, I will discuss possi-
ble consequences of differences in funding ratios
for empirical research on pension accounting.
3. Pension accounting: conceptual 
issues and the development of accounting
standards
In the following section, I will provide an
overview of the main conceptual issues in the ac-
counting for pensions and summarise how interna-
tional pension accounting standards deal with
these issues. In doing so, I will highlight questions
that are contentious and are therefore of particular
interest for empirical research (for a more detailed
discussion, see Napier, 2009).
The accounting for defined contribution systems
is rather simple: contributions companies make in
a given period to pension plans must be expensed
as pension costs.8 If at a balance-sheet date contri-
butions relating to services already rendered by
employees are not fully paid, the company has to
book a liability for accrued expenses. If, converse-
ly, a higher sum has been paid, an asset for prepaid
expenses is recognised. Apart from this, in ‘pure’
defined contribution schemes, where companies
have no further legal or constructive obligations no
matter what the performance of the pension fund,
by implication there are no further costs or liabili-
ties to account for.
Accounting for defined contribution plans, on
the other hand, is complex. It involves, first, the
estimation of the values of liabilities for pension
claims at balance sheet dates. Second, the periodic
cost of the pensions has to be estimated; that is, the
total cost of the pension claims has to be allocated
to the periods in which they are earned by the em-
ployees. Third, any plan assets that might exist
also need to be valued.
Estimating the values of pension liabilities re-
quires actuarial assumptions. Demographic as-
sumptions are related to expected employee
turnover and mortality rates. Financial assump-
tions are needed in order to model expected future
salary and benefit trends. In addition, an interest
rate is needed in order to discount the future bene-
fits to their present value at the balance sheet date.
IAS 19, para.72, stipulates that all assumptions be
‘unbiased and mutually compatible’; financial as-
sumptions have to be ‘based on market expecta-
tions, at the balance sheet date, for the period over
which the obligations are to be settled’. More
specifically, IAS 19, para. 78, prescribes that mar-
ket yields for high quality corporate bonds have to
276 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
6 For a more detailed discussion of multi-employer pension
plans and their implications for accounting, see PAAinE,
2008, ch. 10.
7 Defined contribution plans where obligations to benefici-
ary employees remain with employers are also usually funded.
The plan assets are mostly held by trusts or other separate
legal entities. In principle, such pension plans can be unfund-
ed. The sponsoring company then maintains notional accounts
for beneficiary employees.
8 See IAS 19, para. 43–47.
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be used as discount rates. Similar requirements
pertain to FAS 87.9
It should be noted that the question of which dis-
count rate should be used in pension accounting is
contentious. Traditionally, actuarial valuations
have been based on long-term average rates of re-
turn on pension investments. This, however, im-
plicitly reflects a funding, not a valuation
perspective. Another position holds that future
pension payments should be discounted at the
company’s cost of capital, since pension liabilities
are a claim, like any other liabilities, on compa-
nies’ total assets (Slater and Copeland, 2005).
Others, however, argue that companies’ own credit
risk should (generally) be excluded from the valu-
ation of (pension) liabilities. The recent discussion
paper by the ASB and other European standard-
setters, after reviewing these and other arguments,
concedes that conceptually the discount rate
should comprise a premium for the riskiness of
pension liabilities. However, the paper further ar-
gues that this premium cannot be estimated with
any reliability and that, thus, a risk-free rate of in-
terest should be used to discount expected future
pension payments (PAAinE, 2008: 124).
Both IAS 19 and FAS 87 prescribe that compa-
nies apply the so-called projected-credit-unit
method to attribute pension benefits and the relat-
ed pension cost to the periods of employee service.
This method is based on the notion that pension li-
abilities accrue over time, as employees render
services to the company. Thus, with each year of
service, employees earn additional ‘units’ of bene-
fit entitlement. The liability that is so estimated,
the defined benefit obligation (DBO), is the pres-
ent value of the expected future pension payments
that have been earned by a company’s employees
up to the balance sheet date (IAS 19, para. 7).10
It is important to note that the DBO measure is
based on expectations concerning future pension
payments. Following the going-concern assump-
tion, expected future salary increases and future
increases in the level of pension benefits enter the
valuation. This is not undebated. Critics argue that
the present value of benefits attributed to employ-
ee service rendered to date, based solely on current
and past compensation levels (i.e. the accumulated
benefit obligation, ABO), correctly represents a
company’s obligation at the balance sheet date.
Expected salary increases and other future events
should not impact the valuation of current pension
liabilities, but should be accounted for in the peri-
od in which they occur.11 The IASB is aware of
this debate; it plans to reconsider whether pension
liabilities should be valued based on projected fu-
ture benefits in a future phase of its pension proj-
ect (IASB, 2008a).
Another issue that has caused discussions in the
literature is whether pension claims give rise to li-
abilities before they ‘vest’. Pension arrangements
often include clauses that specify that retirement
benefits earned for past service vest, i.e. become
unconditional on further employment, only after a
minimum period of employment. If, conversely, an
employment contract is terminated before reach-
ing the minimum vesting period, the employee
will receive no pension benefits. According to IAS
19, para. 69, unvested benefits do give rise to pen-
sion obligations (also see FAS 87, para. 42, and
Basis for Conclusion, para. 149).
Pension plan assets mainly consist of financial
assets (as well as investment property), and one
could argue that the ‘normal’ accounting standards
pertaining to these assets could be applied to them
(PAAinE, 2008). However, IAS 19 and FAS 87 de-
fine a specific category of ‘plan assets’ to which
specific valuation rules apply. According to IAS
19, para. 7, plan assets are assets held by a separate
legal entity that exists solely to fund employee
benefits; the assets must be available only for this
purpose; in particular, they are not available to the
company’s own creditors, even in bankruptcy. Plan
assets are to be valued at their fair value at the bal-
ance sheet date (IAS 19, para. 54(c) and 102; FAS
87, para. 49).
Generally, IFRS and US GAAP do not allow the
offsetting of assets and liabilities. IAS 19 and FAS
87, however, allow for the offsetting of pension
obligations and plan assets in the balance sheet.12
(Similarly, pension cost components are netted
against the return on plan assets in the income
statement.) The IASB justifies the offsetting with
the argument that companies do not control plan
assets that satisfy the above-mentioned ‘separabil-
ity’ conditions, and that the obligation to pay the
full liability is rather a matter of form when plan
assets exist. However, the IASB also concedes that
the exception is a ‘pragmatic’ solution that contin-
ues prior practice but is inconsistent with other
IFRS. The IASB has decided to redeliberate on the
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 277
9 FAS 87, para. 44, prescribes the use of a discount rate at
which the pension effectively could be settled. In para. 44A,
the FASB suggests that this could be the rate of return of high-
quality fixed income investments.
10 In FAS 87, the term projected benefit obligation (PBO) is
used synonymously; see FAS 87, para. 17.
11 For instance, Slater and Copeland (2005: 5) argue force-
fully: ‘The accountants’ prescription that future salary increas-
es must be allowed for in the assessment of the pension
liability is plain wrong. … [T]here is no contractual obligation
on a company to provide pay increases. Yes, in the long run a
company would be expected to give salary increases in line
with inflation in order to stay in business. But any salary in-
creases in excess of inflation can be financed only from future
profit and are under the control of the company.’
12 See IAS 19, para. 54; FAS 87, para. 35. Offsetting takes
place on the basis of individual pension plans, i.e. a company
can show both a pension asset and a pension liability on its
balance sheet if it operates several plans, some of which are
overfunded while others are underfunded.
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offsetting of pension assets and liabilities in a later
stage of its pension project (IASB, 2008a: para.
1.11). The discussion paper by PAAinE (2008: 79)
comes to the conclusion that the arguments behind
the current offsetting exception are not convincing
and that a gross presentation of pension liabilities
and pension assets would be appropriate.13
In the income statement, companies have to
present periodic pension costs which consist pri-
marily of service cost and interest cost. Service
cost is the increase of the present value of future
pension benefits arising from employee services
rendered in the period. Interest cost is the increase
in the present value caused by the unwinding of
the discounting over time.14 As mentioned, pen-
sion costs are presented net of the return on plan
assets. More precisely, it is not the realised return
of the period that is deducted from pension costs,
but an expected long-term average return on plan
assets.15 This particular regulation is based on an
actuarial perspective according to which it is the
purpose of plan assets to fund long-term pension
obligations; thus, it is argued, average, smoothed
long-term returns reflect more appropriately the
economic nature of the assets than short-term re-
turns which are more volatile. However, the usage
of an expected return figure instead of actually re-
alised returns in profit and loss is controversial
(Napier, 2009), and empirical studies strongly
suggest that managers exploit the scope inherent
in the estimation of expected returns to manipu-
late earnings (see, for instance, Amir and
Benartzi, 1998; Bergstraesser et al., 2006).16 In
the PAAinE discussion paper, the ASB and other
European standard-setters suggest that in the fu-
ture, companies should report the actual, rather
than the expected return on plan assets (PAAinE,
2008: 176).
The assumptions used in the valuation of pen-
sion liabilities reflect available data and manage-
ment expectations at a given point in time. As time
passes, new information becomes available, and
differences between prior assumptions and finan-
cial and demographic developments may occur.
Such differences as well as changes in assump-
tions give rise to so-called actuarial gains and loss-
es. As has been mentioned, the treatment of
actuarial gains and losses is one of the most con-
tentious aspects of pension accounting. From the
view point of the asset-liability approach, it would
be consistent to recognise pension assets and lia-
bilities at their fair value at the balance sheet date,
and to recognise actuarial gains and losses imme-
diately in the income statement (Fasshauer and
Glaum, 2008). However, this would introduce
volatility into balance sheets and income state-
ments. Furthermore, pension liabilities are not nor-
mally actively traded (Webster, 2008; Pension
Capital Strategies, 2008), so that their fair values
have to be estimated. Some plan assets are also not
traded actively, making further estimations neces-
sary. Since some valuation inputs are not observ-
able in markets, the resulting fair values
correspond to ‘level 3’ of the hierarchy defined in
FAS 157. Because of this, critics of the asset-
liability approach fear that earnings would be in-
fluenced strongly by short-term, transitory fluctu-
ations, by measurement error, and possibly by
managerial manipulation. This criticism weighs
heavily, in particular, for followers of the income
approach who hold that it is the primary purpose of
financial accounting to determine a measure for
company income that is persistent and has, there-
fore, predictive power.
During the deliberations for FAS 87 in the early
1980s, as a response to the above arguments, the
FASB developed the corridor approach which al-
lowed companies to delay the recognition of actu-
arial gains and losses in the balance sheet and in
the income statement as long as they did not ex-
ceed a certain threshold (the greater of 10% of the
DBO or the fair value of plan assets, respectively).
Even if accumulated gains and losses exceeded the
corridor, companies could recognise the excess
over the remaining work-life of the employees that
participate in the pension plan.17 The corridor ap-
proach, which in 1998 was also adopted by the
IASC in a revised version of IAS 19, thus compris-
es a two-stage mechanism that effects a strong
smoothing of pension liabilities and pension costs
over time. It should be mentioned that both IAS 19
and FAS 87 allowed for faster, or indeed full im-
mediate, recognition on a voluntary basis.18 In ad-
dition, companies had to disclose information
about the DBO and the fair value of plan assets,
and hence the funding status of their pension
plans, in the notes to the financial statements.19
Due to their long-term nature, pension positions
are sensitive to assumption changes, and the accu-
mulated amounts of actuarial gains and losses kept
278 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
13 Gerke et al. (2003) argue, and demonstrate with the help
of a simulation study, that only a gross presentation of pension
obligations and pension assets delivers accurate information
about companies’ financial risks and allows analysts and other
users of financial statements a meaningful comparison of
companies with different pension funding strategies.
14 Other pension cost components can result from plan set-
tlements and curtailments (see IAS 19, para. 109–110), and
from acquisitions, divestments, and exchange rate effects.
15 See IAS 19, para. 105–106. Under US GAAP, a further
smoothing mechanism exists in this context. According to
FAS 87, para. 30, the expected rate of return may be multiplied
with either the fair value of plan assets or with a ‘smoothed
fair value’, i.e. a moving average of plan asset fair values.
16 These and other studies on earnings management in pen-
sion accounting will be discussed in more detail below; see
Section 4.2.
17 See IAS 19, para. 93; FAS 87, para. 32.
18 See IAS 19, para. 93; FAS 87. para. 33.
19 See IAS 19, para. 120A; FAS 132(R), para. 5.
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outside the main financial statements can therefore
become large (Amen, 2007).20 For this reason,
over recent years the corridor approach has drawn
sharp criticism. In particular, financial analysts
have pointed out that this regulation allows for fi-
nancial reporting that is incomplete and not fully
transparent.21 As a reaction, the IASB in 2004
promulgated a revised version of IAS 19 which
now gives companies a new, third option for the
treatment of actuarial gains and losses. In addition
to the corridor approach and to voluntary faster or
full recognition through the income statement,
companies can now also fully and immediately
recognise actuarial gains and losses through the
‘statement of recognised income and expense’,
that is, effectively in shareholders’ equity, thereby
bypassing the income statement. Furthermore, in
2006 the FASB published FAS 158 which amends
FAS 87 so that US companies are now required to
fully and immediately recognise actuarial gains
and losses through shareholders’ equity. However,
in contrast to IAS 19, US GAAP requires that the
gains and losses will not remain in equity; instead
they are ‘recycled’ through the income statement
over time, using the corridor approach.
As mentioned, the IASB and the FASB are cur-
rently working towards further reforms of their
pension accounting standards. According to a dis-
cussion paper published in March 2008, the IASB
has tentatively decided to abolish the corridor ap-
proach and to require full and immediate recogni-
tion of net pension liabilities in balance sheets. The
IASB has yet to decide on how the components of
changes to pension assets and liabilities will have
to be presented. Three approaches are considered:
(i) to require that all changes in the DBO and in the
value of plan assets must be presented in profit or
loss in the period in which they occur; (ii) to re-
quire only the costs of service to be presented in
profit or loss while other changes are to be present-
ed in comprehensive income; or (iii) to require that
measurements arising from changes in financial
assumptions are reported in comprehensive in-
come while other changes in the DBO and in plan
assets are presented in profit or loss (IASB, 2008a:
para. PV5).
Finally, it should be mentioned in this context
that currently the IASB (together with the FASB)
also has a project on financial statement presenta-
tion under way (IASB, 2008c). In a recent discus-
sion paper emanating from this project, it is
proposed that companies in the future should pub-
lish a single integrated statement of comprehensive
income. In this statement, income and expenses
will be disclosed separately for operating activities,
for financing, and for other performance.
Anticipating these changes to financial statement
presentation, the ASB and other European stan-
dard-setters suggest in their recent working paper
on pension accounting that pension cost compo-
nents should be separated in the following way.
Service cost should be reported within operating
activities; interest cost, the effects of changes in in-
terest rates, and the actual (not the expected) return
on plan assets should be reported as part of financ-
ing costs; and actuarial gains and losses (other than
those from changes in interest rates) should be re-
ported within other financial performance, i.e. out-
side operating activities (PAAinE, 2008: ch. 8).
4. Pension accounting research
The intensive debate that has surrounded the de-
velopment of pension accounting standards and
their application in practice over the past decades
has stimulated a multitude of empirical studies. In
this review, I concentrate on capital-markets ori-
ented empirical research. A lot of work in this area
has focused on two issues, the value-relevance of
pension accounting information and earnings man-
agement in pension accounting. Other studies have
analysed to which degree capital markets are effi-
cient with regard to pension accounting informa-
tion. Pension accounting is very complex, and in
addition reported pension accounting amounts
may be distorted by earnings management. Thus, it
is of interest whether investors can cope with the
complexity and fully understand and incorporate
published pension accounting information in their
investment decisions. Closely linked to this is the
question – what effect does earnings management
have on the value-relevance of pension accounting
information. In the following, I will first give an
overview of the development of research on value-
relevance; then I will address studies on earnings
management. Subsequently, I discuss studies on
information efficiency and on the effects of earn-
ings management on the value-relevance of pen-
sion information.
4.1. The value-relevance of pension accounting
Value-relevance studies, also called association
studies, are one way of investigating whether fi-
nancial statement information is decision-useful to
capital market participants, as intended by interna-
tional standard-setters. By regressing financial
statement data on share prices, researchers attempt
to gauge whether financial statement data are re-
flected systematically in stock market valuations.
Depending on the precise research question and
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 279
20 For instance, at the end of 2004, Bayer, a large German
chemical company, had accumulated total unrecognised actu-
arial losses amounting to €2.0bn. The unrecognised amounts
represented 14.4% of Bayer’s total pension liabilities; see
Bayer, 2004. (In 2005, Bayer decided to adopt the new option
provided by IAS 19 to recognise actuarial gains and losses
fully through equity.)
21 See, for instance, Credit Suisse First Boston (2005) or JP
Morgan (2006).
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model, different studies investigate whether partic-
ular accounting amounts (e.g. intangible assets)
are associated with share prices, whether alterna-
tive accounting amounts (e.g. amounts prepared
under different national or international GAAP)
are more or less strongly associated with share
prices (relative association studies), or whether
specific accounting numbers (e.g. fair values dis-
closed in the notes) contribute to the explanation
of shares prices, given other published information
(e.g. corresponding book values recognised in the
balance sheet; incremental association studies)
(Barth, 2000; Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Barth
et al., 2001).
It has to be emphasised that value-relevance
studies can only provide indirect evidence of the
decision-usefulness of financial statement infor-
mation. Value-relevance tests indicate whether
there is a significant correlation between share
prices and financial statement information over a
given test period, or, to put it differently, whether
the financial statement information is consistent
with the information set that has determined the
stock market valuation. However, the methodolo-
gy does not test for whether investors have actual-
ly made use of the respective balance sheet,
income, or cash flow data in the formation of their
investment decisions. In fact, it is possible, and in
many cases probable, that investors will have had
access to the respective information through other
information channels before they were published
in the financial statements (Beaver, 2002). More
direct tests of the decision-usefulness are provided
by the event-study methodology (Barth, 2000).
However, this methodology which is extensively
used in other areas of accounting research has so
far only played a minor role in pension accounting
research.
Value-relevance research is controversial.
Holthausen and Watts (2001) contend, in particu-
lar, that standard-setters can gain only little insight
from this type of research because it focuses exclu-
sively on stock market valuation and thus neglects
other purposes of financial reporting (contracting).
The authors also criticise the indirect nature of the
test that does not allow inferences on the actual use
of accounting information by decision makers.
Furthermore, they argue that value-relevance stud-
ies rest on the assumption of markets being infor-
mationally efficient, and they, finally, point out
econometric problems. Proponents of value-rele-
vance research (e.g. Barth, 2000; Barth et al.,
2001; Beaver, 2002), on the other hand, hold that
the orientation on stock market valuation is justi-
fied by the prominent role standard-setters ascribe
to equity investors as users of financial reporting.
They point out that value-relevance research is but
one research method that attempts to opera-
tionalise the standard-setters’ concept of decision-
usefulness; it should be combined with other meth-
ods to gain deeper insights into the usefulness of
financial reporting. As to the assumption of market
efficiency, Barth et al. (2001) explain that value-
relevance research can be of interest even in the
absence of market efficiency as long as stock mar-
ket valuations reflect investors’ expectations.22
Finally, it is argued that ‘most, if not all, of the
econometric issues faced here are common to
other areas of accounting research’ (Beaver, 2002:
464).
In the following, I first address earlier value-rel-
evance studies that have used earnings discount
models and balance sheet models, then I focus on
more recent studies that apply empirical variants
of the Ohlson model. In a subsequent section, I
briefly refer to related work on the ‘credit-rele-
vance’ of pension accounting and on the value-rel-
evance of post-retirement benefits other than
pensions. Lastly, I summarise and critically evalu-
ate the results of the research on value-relevance.
Earnings discount models
Two early studies in the finance literature by
Oldfield (1977) and Feldstein and Seligman
(1981) were motivated by changes in US pension
legislation in the 1970s.23 The researchers use vari-
ants of earnings discount models based on
Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1966) and, control-
ling for growth and risk factors, test for samples of
US stock-listed companies in the 1970s whether
companies unfunded pension obligations are re-
flected in share prices. They find that accounting
measures for unfunded vested pension benefits
(which US companies had to disclose under 
ABP 8) are systematically reflected in share price
valuations.
Daley (1984) is the first in this line of research
who explicitly adopts an accounting perspective.
He seeks to find out whether alternative pension
accounting measures that US companies were re-
quired to disclose during the 1970s are associated
with stock market valuations. Daley also uses an
earnings discount model to explain companies’
market value of equity (MVE). He disaggregates
the earnings variable into earnings before pension
280 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
22 Also see Aboody et al. (2002) who discuss in more detail
the potential impact of market inefficiencies on inferences
from value-relevance studies. Looking at market inefficiencies
with regard to financial accounting information, they conclude
that value-relevance studies based on return regressions are
seriously affected by market values of stocks not fully reflect-
ing publicly available information; level regressions (which
are commonly used in studies on pension accounting) are not
materially affected.
23 The introduction of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) in 1974 is generally seen as a corner-
stone in US pension regulation; the implications of ERISA for
pension accounting are discussed further in Bulow (1982) and
Fortune (2005).
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cost (EbPC) and pension cost (PC). Thus, ignoring
control variables for risk and growth, and sup-
pressing company and time subscripts, the model
has the following structure:24
MVE = α + β1EbPC + β2PC + ε (1)
Daley finds for his sample of US companies for
the years 1975–1979 that pension expenses are
value-relevant, i.e. estimations for the regression
coefficient‚ β2, which can be interpreted as a valu-
ation multiple for pension costs, turn out to be sig-
nificantly negative. Furthermore, the absolute
magnitude of the estimates are statistically indis-
tinguishable from those of β1, suggesting that pen-
sion expenses are priced equivalently to other
income and expenses. Daley’s results are less con-
sistent for models where pension expenses are re-
placed by the two pension obligation measures.
Overall, Daley’s results should be interpreted with
caution due to a relatively small sample size and to
possible measurement error in his pension ac-
counting data, given that ABP 8 allowed pension
accounting measures to be computed using sever-
al alternative actuarial cost methods.
The value-relevance of pension costs has been
investigated in more depth by Barth et al. (1992).
FAS 87, issued in 1985, required companies to use
the projected-credit-unit method to estimate pen-
sion costs and pension liabilities, and to disclose
separately several components of pension costs,
most notably service cost (SVC), interest cost
(INT), and the expected return on plan assets
(RPLNA). Barth, Beaver and Landsman first use a
basic model similar to Equation (1). In contrast to
Daley (1984), they find that the estimated regres-
sion coefficient for total pension cost (β2) is signif-
icantly larger than the estimated coefficient for
revenues and non-pension expenses (β1). This is
consistent with the market expecting a higher per-
sistency for pension cost than for other income and
expenses, or, in other words, with a lower discount
rate being applied to pension cost. In a further step,
Barth et al. (1992) disaggregate the pension cost
components in order to allow the regression coef-
ficients to differ from one another. Thus, their full
empirical model has the following structure:
MVE = α + β1EbPC + β2SVC + β3INT (2)
+ β4RPLNA + βOther PC – Components + ε
Barth et al. find, as expected, that the coefficient
on interest cost is significantly negative and that
the coefficient on the return on plan assets is sig-
nificantly positive. Contrary to expectations, the
coefficient on service cost is measured with a pos-
itive sign, significantly so in some model specifi-
cations. This puzzling result, that has also turned
up in later studies, could be attributable to multi-
collinearity between the pension cost components.
Another possibility is that service costs are not
viewed by the market as a measure for the pension
liability. In a more recent paper, Hann et al.
(2007a) suggest that the positive relation between
service cost and stock prices could be attributable
to service cost serving as a proxy for value created
by human capital. In their empirical model (see
below), they add the number of employees (size of
workforce) and research and development cost (in-
tangible asset creation) as control variables and
find that the service cost coefficient then becomes
negative. This is an interesting finding because it
could denote that corporate pension systems do not
only have a financial nature, as implied by the
usual valuation models. By focusing exclusively
on financial aspects, most models ignore that from
a labour economics perspective, pension plans can
be interpreted as ‘implicit contracts’ that serve the
purpose to bind employees to their companies, to
provide incentives for increased productivity, and
to generally improve the long-term relationship
between employees and their employees (Ippolito,
1985; Klumpes, 2001).
Balance sheet models
Landsman (1986) was the first to use a balance-
sheet model to examine the value-relevance of
pension accounting, i.e. he regresses the market
value of companies’ equity on accounting meas-
ures for assets and liabilities. In order to find out
whether pension assets and pension liabilities are
valued by the stock market like other corporate 
assets and liabilities, he splits up companies’ total
assets into pension assets (PLA) and other, non-
pension assets (NPA), and companies’ total liabili-
ties into pension liabilities (PL) and other,
non-pension liabilities (NPL). Hence, his model
has the following structure:
MVE = α + β1NPA + β2NPL + β3PLA (3)
+ β4PL + ε
If the model is correctly specified and if in-
vestors view pension assets and pension liabilities
as corporate assets and liabilities, β3 should be 1,
and β4 should be –1, that is, an increase of plan as-
sets by one dollar should increase the market
value of equity by one dollar, and an increase in
pension liabilities by one dollar should decrease
MVE by one dollar. Landsman finds for his sam-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 281
24 Here and in the following, I ignore the scaling of vari-
ables that authors undertake in order to deal with possible
problems related to heteroscedasticity. Daley scales all vari-
ables with total assets. In other studies, variables are scaled
with sales (e.g. Landsman, 1986), and in more recent studies,
variables are often scaled by shares outstanding, resulting in
per-share valuation models. I will briefly return to the scaling
of variables, and other methodological issues, in a later section
of the paper.
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ple of US companies for the years 1979–1981 that
the regression coefficient on pension liabilities is
significantly negative and the coefficient on pen-
sion assets is (in most model specifications) sig-
nificantly positive. He concludes that the
information on pension assets and pension liabili-
ties (ABO), which US companies at that time had
to disclose according to FAS 36, is value-relevant
in the same way as information on other corporate
assets and liabilities. However, it should be noted
that the coefficients of Landsman’s model are
measured with relatively high standard errors, and
that their absolute values are often markedly lower
or higher than their theoretical values of 1 or –1.
Furthermore, Landsman’s estimations of equation
(3) result in relatively large and statistically sig-
nificant intercept terms. Theoretically, based on
the simple balance sheet identity, the intercept
should be zero.
Landsman’s overall conclusion that disclosed
accounting measures for pension assets and liabil-
ities are valued similarly to recognised assets and
liabilities is supported through related research by
Dhaliwal (1986). He examines the impact unfund-
ed pension obligations have on companies’ sys-
tematic risk. He develops a model that links
companies’ systematic risk to operational risk and
financial risk (leverage), and he shows, based on
a sample of US companies for the years
1976–1979, that investors take information on un-
funded pension liabilities into consideration when
assessing financial risk. A more recent study by
Jin et al. (2006) that uses a more sophisticated
methodology and more recent data (1993–1998)
also comes to the conclusion that equity betas ap-
pear to accurately reflect the betas of their pension
assets and liabilities, ‘despite the practical diffi-
culties of deciphering corporate pension ac-
counts’.25
As noted above, the rules for the recognition and
measurement of pension assets and liabilities have
been, and continue to be, contentious. Following
the introduction of FAS 87 in the US, companies in
the second half of the 1980s were required to ei-
ther recognise or disclose several different meas-
ures for both pension assets and liabilities. Barth
(1991) investigates which of the measures are
most closely associated with share price valua-
tions, that is, which are most consistent with those
implicitly utilised by investors. She develops an
empirical procedure that allows her to determine
the error with which pension accounting amounts
are measured, i.e. the differences between book
values and market values of pension assets and li-
abilities. She finds for a sample of US companies
for the years 1985–1987 that the fair values of pen-
sion assets and the ABO and PBO for pension lia-
bilities, which are only disclosed in the notes, are
measured with less error than recognised net pen-
sion assets or liabilities. When focusing on compa-
nies where pension benefit formulas depend
strongly on salary progression, the PBO exhibits
less measurement error than the ABO.
The results of Barth (1991) with respect to pen-
sion liabilities are corroborated by Gopalakrishnan
and Sugrue (1993). They extend the model of
Landsman (1986) and investigate whether the un-
vested part of the pension obligation (UNVEST)
and the expected future salary progression
(SALARY, i.e. the difference between ABO and
PBO) are value-relevant. This leads to the follow-
ing model structure:
MVE = α + β1NPA + β2NPL + β3PLA (4)
+ β4VBO + β5UNVEST + β6SALARY + ε
Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue find for a sample of
US companies for 1987 and 1988 that the esti-
mates of β4, β5 and β6 are all significantly nega-
tive. Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue’s regression
estimates, like those of Landsman (1986), also dif-
fer from the expected values. Furthermore, β5 andβ6 are considerably larger than those for β4. An 
F-test rejects the hypothesis that the three esti-
mates are equal to each other. Gopalakrishnan and
Sugrue suggest that this could be because investors
perceive the unvested and the salary progression
components of the PBO as inherently more noisy
than the vested benefit obligation component.
Ohlson models
Most recent studies on the value-relevance of
pension accounting information are based on em-
pirical variants of the Ohlson (1995) model.
According to the Ohlson model, firm value can be
explained as the sum of the book value of equity
and the present value of expected future abnormal
earnings.26 If companies’ assets and liabilities
were completely recognised and valued at their
‘true’ economic values at the balance sheet date,
the book value of equity would be equal to its mar-
ket value. However, accounting standards prohibit
large parts of companies’ intangible assets from
being recognised, and they often require that assets
that are recognised are carried at book values
lower than current market values. Ohlson (1995)
shows that under certain conditions the portion of
the value of a company not captured by book value
of equity is reflected in expected future abnormal
earnings, i.e. in residual income.
The Ohlson model has become very influential
as it provides a direct link between accounting
measures and firm value (Kothari, 2001; Beaver,
2002). In empirical versions, the expected future
abnormal returns are usually approximated by 
282 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
25 Jin et al. (2006: 22).
26 See Ohlson (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995).
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analysts’ earnings forecasts or, more simply, by re-
alised earnings.27 As will be shown below, practi-
cally all recent studies on the value-relevance of
pension accounting make use of the Ohlson model.
The empirical models, although different in detail,
have the following common basic structure:
MVE = α + β1NPE + β2EbPC + β3PLA (5)
+ β4PL + β5PC + ε
where NPE is companies’ owners’ equity plus net
pension liabilities, EbPC is earnings before pen-
sion costs, PLA is plan assets, PL is pension liabil-
ities, and PC is pension costs. By taking into
consideration balance sheet and income measures
simultaneously, these models are thought to be
generally better specified than pure balance sheet
(or income) models.
Furthermore, the models allow one to address
more directly research questions that are at the
heart of the current debate on pension accounting.
First, it can be examined whether the complemen-
tarity of balance sheet and income data underlying
the Ohlson model applies to pension accounting
measures. This would not be the case if pension as-
sets and liabilities are purely financial in nature,
that is, if there are no synergies with other corpo-
rate assets and liabilities, if there are no other intan-
gibles attached to them, and if their fair values can
be measured with sufficient reliability. If these con-
ditions are fulfilled, Equation (5) is overspecified
and either the balance sheet amounts or the income
amounts are redundant (Barth et al. 1993). Based
on these considerations, it can then be asked
whether pension assets and liabilities or, alterna-
tively, pension costs are more closely associated
with stock market valuations, and thus potentially
more decision-useful to investors. A related, second
question is whether pension information is more
decision-useful when assets or liabilities, and asso-
ciated costs, are measured on a fair-value basis, or
when the measures are smoothed with the corridor
and other smoothing mechanisms. Empirical stud-
ies that jointly examine the two above questions
basically test whether the asset-liability approach
or the income approach lead to more decision-use-
ful information for investors.
A further aspect has to be taken into considera-
tion. When comparing the value-relevance of
smoothed corridor pension amounts and fair-value
pension amounts, researchers often effectively
compare information that is recognised in balance
sheets or income statements with information that
is disclosed in the notes. For instance, according to
FAS 87, US companies until recently were al-
lowed to recognise smoothed net pension values in
their balance sheets and smoothed pension costs in
their income statements, while fair values of pen-
sion assets and liabilities were disclosed in the
notes. In other words, in empirical studies the re-
search question regarding the superiority of the
asset-liability and the income approach is inter-
twined with a further, ‘classical’ accounting ques-
tion, the question whether recognition and
disclosure are perfect substitutes, or whether fi-
nancial statement users give more weight to infor-
mation that is recognised in comparison to
information that is merely disclosed.
The first study to use the Ohlson model to inves-
tigate the value-relevance of pension accounting
was Barth et al. (1993). The study is based on data
for 300 US companies for the years 1987–1990.
Their major finding is that the fair value of pension
assets and the fair value like PBO, which are dis-
closed in the notes, are significantly correlated
with share price valuations, whereas the incremen-
tal explanatory value of pension cost components
(also disclosed in the footnotes) are not signifi-
cantly different from zero. The authors conclude:
‘Tests reveal that pension cost component infor-
mation is largely redundant in explaining share
prices, once pension balance sheet variables are
included.’28
A study conducted ten years later by Coronado
and Sharpe (2003) follows a very similar research
design. They compare the value-relevance of the
funding status of pension plans, i.e. the difference
between the PBO and the fair value of plan assets
(disclosed in the notes), with the value-relevance
of pension costs (recognised in the income state-
ment, and smoothed due to the corridor approach
and other mechanisms). Interestingly, Coronado
and Sharpe arrive at a result that is in sharp con-
trast to that of Barth et al. (1993). For their sample
of US companies comprising the S&P 500 index in
the years 1993–2001 it is not the funding status of
pension plans, but pension income and expenses
that turn out to be relevant for the explanation of
share prices. As Coronado and Sharpe (2003: 324)
point out, ‘the market appears to pay more atten-
tion to the flow of pension induced accruals report-
ed in the body of the income statement than to the
marked-to-market value of pension assets and lia-
bilities reported in the footnotes.’ In a recent work-
ing paper, Coronado et al. (2008) extend the
investigation to the years 2002–2005 and find the
same results.
Coronado and Sharpe (2003) and Coronado et
al. (2008) surmise that their results are a reflection
of investors’ earnings fixation. During the second
half of the 1990s, the pension plans of S&P 500
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 283
27 For empirical versions of the Ohlson model, see Dechow
et al. (1999); Lo and Lys (2000); Barth et al. (1998); Collins et
al. (1999). Also see Landsman et al. (2007) who discuss theo-
retical values for regression coefficients in empirical versions
of the Ohlson model.
28 Barth et al. (1993: 25).
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companies were, on average, overfunded, and
companies reported, on average, pension income
rather than pension expenses because expected re-
turns on plan assets exceeded pension costs. In
fact, because of the income smoothing mecha-
nisms of FAS 87, companies continued to report
pension income even in the first years of the
2000s, although S&P 500 pension plans by then
were underfunded, following the deterioration of
the stock markets. Coronado and Sharpe argue that
investors are misled by the smoothing of pension
accruals which signal a higher persistency of pen-
sion induced income than is economically justi-
fied. Because of this, according to the authors,
investors tend to overvalue companies that spon-
sor defined benefit pension plans (also see
Franzoni and Marín, 2006; Picconi, 2006).
An interesting further finding in this context is
provided by Wiedman and Wier (2004). Their
study is based on data for 128 Canadian companies
for the years 2000 and 2001. Wiedman and Wier
investigate whether stock market investors treat
net assets from overfunded pension plans and net
liabilities from underfunded plans equivalently. In
2000, 72% of the sample companies had overfund-
ed plans, and in 2001 the ratio was 41%. Wiedman
and Wier’s main empirical model is derived from
Equation (5), with an indicator variable denoting
companies with overfunded plans. Their findings
suggest that the funding status is more closely as-
sociated with stock prices for companies with un-
derfunded plans than for companies with
overfunded plans. More precisely, the net pension
asset of companies with overfunded plans appears
not to be impounded in stock market valuations at
all. According to Wiedman and Wier (2004: 238)
this suggests that ‘investors view deficits arising
from plan under-funding as liabilities of the spon-
soring firm, but do not appear to view surpluses
arising from plan over-funding as assets of the
firm.’
Other studies that examine the effects of pension
assets and liabilities on bond ratings (see below)
also produce asymmetric results. These results in-
dicate that unfunded pension liabilities reduce debt
ratings more strongly than pension assets increase
them (Maher, 1987; Carroll and Niehaus, 1998). A
reason for this seemingly puzzling result could be
that, under the going-concern assumption, compa-
nies are required to fund pension deficits over
time, while it is not fully clear whether companies
actually control net pension assets. Despite possi-
ble adverse effects on labour relations (Klumpes,
2001), pension plan ‘reversions’, i.e. terminations
by sponsoring companies with the intent to claim
the plan surplus, often took place in the US in the
early 1980s (Ippolito, 1985; Stone, 1987).29
However, reversions may be more difficult to
achieve in other countries, and they have also been
made much more difficult in the US by new regu-
latory hurdles and tax disincentives (Ippolito,
2001; Fortune, 2005).
Hann et al. (2007a) also address basically the
same research question as Barth et al. (1993) and
Coronado and Sharpe (2003). They compare the
value-relevance of recognised pension amounts
that are smoothed according to FAS 87 with the
value-relevance of fair-value pension amounts that
are disclosed in companies’ footnotes. Using data
for more than 2,000 US companies for the years
from 1991 to 2001, Hann et al. first document that
immediate and full recognition of actuarial gains
and losses greatly increases the volatility of pen-
sion costs, and, hence, decreases the persistency of
earnings. Their full empirical model corresponds
to Equation (5), however with pension assets and
liabilities netted (NetPAL), and pension expenses
disaggregated into a recurring component (RecPC,
equal to service cost plus interest cost less expect-
ed return on plan assets) and a gains/losses compo-
nent (PGL):30
MVE = α + β1NPE + β2EbPC + β3NetPAL (6)
+ β4RecPC + β5PGL + ε
Hann et al. estimate the equation twice, once
with FAS 87 amounts, once with fair-value
amounts. They find that the explanatory power of
both estimations is not statistically different, based
on a Vuong (1989) test. However, pension cost
components are less persistent and hence less
value-relevant under fair-value accounting.
In a recent working paper, Kiosse et al. (2007)
arrive at similar results. The authors also use US
data; their sample comprises 3,388 firm-years for
1998–2005. Using a version of the Ohlson model,
they compare the value-relevance of recognised
FAS 87 pension costs and their components with
the value-relevance of two alternative measures,
fair-value changes and a ‘core pension cost meas-
ure’ developed by Standard & Poor’s (2002).31
Kiosse et al. (2007) find that the smoothed pension
costs are more closely correlated with stock mar-
284 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
29 Also see Mittelstaedt (1989), Thomas (1989), and
Mittelstaedt and Regier (1993) who investigate the motiva-
tions behind and the financial consequences of pension plan
terminations.
30 In the ‘FAS 87 model’, of Hann et al., PGL corresponds
to the amortisation of unrecognised amounts. In their fair-
value model version, it consists mainly of actuarial gains and
losses. Furthermore, the above model description ignores that
Hann et al. (2007a), as already discussed above, add compa-
nies’ numbers of employees and R&D costs to control for in-
tangible assets created by human capital.
31 Standard & Poor’s argues that the return on plan assets
should not increase companies’ earnings because the sponsor-
ing companies do not have control over the assets.
Concurrently, they only add interest costs to pension costs in
as far as they exceed the return on plan assets. See, Standard
& Poor’s (2002).
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ket valuations than fair-value pension cost meas-
ures, or the Standard & Poor’s ‘core pension cost
measure’ (which is not significant at all).
Under FAS 87, companies, until recently, had
the option to delay recognition of actuarial gains
and losses over long horizons, and under IAS 19
this option still exists. If the option is used, the
recognised pension position in the balance sheet
does not include ‘the most current and most rele-
vant information’32 concerning the valuation of
pension plans. However, as critics of the asset-lia-
bility approach would point out, actuarial gains
and losses may reflect short-term, transitory fluc-
tuations of market parameters and may be subject
to measurement error and managerial manipula-
tion. As explained above in Section 3, FAS 87 was
amended in 2006 and now requires full and imme-
diate recognition of all actuarial gains and losses in
the balance sheet; the IASB is also considering
making full recognition mandatory in a further re-
vision of IAS 19. Therefore, it is of particular in-
terest to investigate whether the new approach will
lead to more decision-useful information to capital
market participants. More precisely, it should be
investigated whether within the balance sheet (net)
pension assets or liabilities that are smoothed, or
pension assets or liabilities that are measured at
fair value, are more decision-useful to investors. A
closely related question is whether actuarial gains
and losses are incrementally value-relevant over
and above that of smoothed pension assets and li-
abilities.
This aspect has received only scant attention in
the literature so far. One reason for this could be
that all studies discussed above have been based
on US data, with the exception of Wiedman and
Wier (2004) who use Canadian data. Under US
GAAP (and under Canadian GAAP), companies
are allowed to offset plan assets and pension liabil-
ities, and given high funding ratios, the net bal-
ances of US companies are typically very small in
relation to total pension assets and liabilities. Thus,
most previous studies have concentrated either on
the value-relevance of pension costs and their
components (Barth et al., 1992; Kiosse et al.,
2007), or on the question whether fair-value pen-
sion assets and liabilities or pension costs, either
smoothed or at fair value, are dominant for stock
market valuations (Barth et al., 1993; Coronado
and Sharpe, 2003).
The only US study that compares, inter alia, the
value-relevance of alternative balance sheet pen-
sion amounts is Hann et al. (2007a). In their esti-
mations of Equation (6), the coefficient on net
pension assets/liabilities (β3) is somewhat larger in
the fair-value model specification than in the
model with smoothed FAS 87 measures; however,
the difference between the two estimates is statis-
tically insignificant. A study that sheds more light
on the issue is Fasshauer and Glaum (2008). This
study is an exception as it is based not on US data,
but on data for German companies that prepare fi-
nancial statements according to IFRS or US
GAAP. Unlike US companies, German companies
are not required to fund defined benefit plans.
Therefore, in comparison to US companies, the av-
erage funding level of pension plans is much
lower, resulting in substantial recognised net pen-
sion liabilities. For their sample of 101 companies
for the time from 1999 to 2005, the average fund-
ing ratio is 26.14% (median 10.06%). Fasshauer
and Glaum apply variants of the Ohlson model in
which they disaggregate the funding status into the
recognised liability (RecPAL) and unrecognised
amounts (UNREC), the latter consisting mainly of
actuarial gains and losses that are deferred follow-
ing FAS 87 or IAS 19. Their main model thus has
the following structure:
MVE = α + β1NPE + β2EbPC + β3RecPAL (7)
+ β4UNREC + β5PC + ε
Fasshauer and Glaum find, first, that in the
German context pension balance sheet amounts
appear more important for stock market valuation
than pension costs. That is, while the estimates for
β3 and β4 have the expected signs and are statisti-
cally significant, the estimate for the pension cost
coefficient (β5) turns out to be insignificant. In that
respect, their findings support the earlier results of
Barth et al. (1993) and are in contrast to those of
Coronado and Sharpe (2003). Second, Fasshauer
and Glaum find that unrecognised amounts (actu-
arial gains and losses) are incrementally value-rel-
evant. Furthermore, when splitting up their sample
into companies with unrecognised gains and those
with unrecognised losses, estimations for β4 have
the expected signs and are significant in both sub-
samples, i.e. they are positive for gain-companies
and negative for loss-companies.
Further value-relevance research
In the following, I will refer to research in two
‘neighbouring’ areas of the value-relevance of
pension accounting, the ‘credit’-relevance of pen-
sion accounting and the value-relevance of the ac-
counting for post-employment benefits other than
pensions.
The conceptual frameworks of both FASB and
IASB state that financial reporting should provide
information that is decision-useful not only to eq-
uity investors, but also to creditors (IASB, 2008b:
para. OB2). In accordance with this, it is interest-
ing to investigate whether pension accounting
helps creditors to forecast default on future debt
payments (predictive value), or to review earlier
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 285
32 FAS 87, para. BC104.
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such forecasts (confirmatory value) (IASB, 2008b:
para. QC3). While the actual decision-making of
creditors is difficult to observe, several empirical
studies address whether pension accounting infor-
mation has explanatory power for corporate bond
ratings. These studies apply probit models, with
Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s ratings being ex-
plained by pension accounting information, con-
trolling for key financial ratios such as liquidity,
leverage, profitability, which have been found
helpful in the explanation of credit ratings in prior
research.
Early studies by Martin and Henderson (1983)
and Maher (1987) for US companies in the late
1970s and early 1980s produce only weak results.
A later study by Carroll and Niehaus (1998) using
US data for 1987–1994, however, comes to the
conclusion that accounting information on pension
assets and pension liabilities significantly influ-
ences bond ratings and is, in this sense, ‘credit-rel-
evant’. Maher (1996) obtains similar results for
accounting information on post-retirement bene-
fits other than pensions. Hann et al., (2007a) also
examine the relative credit-relevance of smoothed
FAS 87 accounting measures and fair-value pen-
sion measures. Similar to the same study’s results
on equity value-relevance (see above), in the con-
text of an Ohlson model that combines balance
sheet and income data, the explanatory power of
smoothed FAS 87 pension amounts and fair-value
pension amounts are statistically not different from
each other.
All of the above mentioned studies use bond rat-
ings as the dependent variable. A study by
Cardinale (2007) analyses credit spreads for US
corporate bonds. Based on data for more than
12,000 ‘bond-years’, he finds that the size of the
unfunded pension liability, scaled by company
value, is significantly associated with bond
spreads. Further analysis shows that the sensitivity
of spreads to pension deficits is much larger for
high-yield bonds (i.e. for companies more likely to
default) than for investment grade bonds. Another
finding is that although unfunded liabilities in-
crease credit spreads, overfunded liabilities do not
appear to improve the spreads. This corresponds
with the already mentioned asymmetric relation-
ship between pension assets and liabilities and
bond ratings found by Maher (1987) and Carroll
and Niehaus (1998). Possible reasons for these ob-
servations have been discussed above.
Several empirical studies have investigated the
value-relevance of post-employment benefits
other than pensions. Other post-employment bene-
fits (OPEB) are primarily health-care benefits
companies provide for their employees either for
free or on subsidised terms. Health-care benefits
are particularly important in the US where em-
ployees are not automatically covered by the pub-
lic (social security) health insurance system. US
companies’ obligations for OPEB can be very
large.33 US companies are not required to fund
their OPEB obligations (in that sense, they are
similar to pension obligations in some Continental
European countries where pension funding is not
mandatory). Estimating the value of OPEB is
highly complex. As for pension benefits, they are
long term, and their value depends on demograph-
ic assumptions concerning employee turnover, re-
tirement age, mortality, and on the discount rate
used to determine the present value of the expect-
ed future benefit. In addition, the value of the ben-
efits depends on estimations of future health-care
costs (and reimbursements from the public health
insurance system, Medicare) which are very diffi-
cult to estimate. These additional uncertainties are
the reason why the reliability of OBEP liability es-
timates is often thought to be even lower than that
of pension benefits (Choi et al., 1997).
Because of this, it was highly controversial
when the FASB in 1990 issued FAS 106
‘Employers’ accounting for post-retirement bene-
fits other than pensions’ which for the first time re-
quired companies to account for OPEB obligations
on the basis of the accrual principle. The basic
principles of FAS 106 are the same as those for
FAS 87. That is, after both standards have been
amended by FAS 158, companies are obliged to re-
port the funding status of OPEB obligations on the
balance sheets; OPEB costs, on the other hand,
continue be smoothed due to the deferred reocog-
nition of, inter alia, actuarial gains and losses.34
Studies on the value-relevance of OPEB obliga-
tions address similar questions and use similar
methods as those on the value-relevance of pen-
sion obligations. Early studies by Mittelstaedt and
Warshawsky (1993) and Amir (1993) use data re-
lating to the time before FAS 106 when US com-
panies accounted for OPEB benefits on a cash
basis. Using financial statement information on
these cash payments and other assumptions, the
authors estimate companies’ OPEB obligations
and then investigate whether the estimations are
impounded in stock market valuations. Both stud-
ies conclude that the stock market does value
OPEB obligations.
In a later study that makes use of FAS 106 man-
dated disclosures, Amir (1996) finds only recog-
nised OPEB amounts to be value-relevant,
286 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
33 For instance, General Motors (GM), at the end of 2007
had OPEB obligations of $64.0bn, in addition to its PBO of
$109.0bn. Since most of the OPEB obligations are not funded,
GM showed an OPEB liability of $47.4bn on the face of its
balance sheet. GM’s pension plans, on the other hand, were
overfunded at the end of 2007, resulting in a net asset position
of $8.3bn on the balance sheet; see General Motors (2007).
34 Under IFRS, the same rules apply to OBEP obligations as
to pension obligations; see IAS 19, para. 24.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:04
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
whereas amounts that are unrecognised because of
deferral mechanisms are not. A further result from
this study is that within the context of an Ohlson
model, income statement data on OPEB costs
proves to be more important for stock market val-
uation than OPEB balance sheet data. However,
when measurement error associated with OPEB
balance sheet amounts is controlled for using sen-
sitivity measures (which companies are required to
disclose according to FAS 106), balance sheet data
becomes more value-relevant than the income
data.
Choi et al. (1997) also use data for US compa-
nies from the early 1990s and confirm, on the basis
of a balance sheet model, that OPEB amounts are
incrementally value-relevant over other non-pen-
sion and pension assets and liabilities. They find,
however, that the estimated coefficient on the
OPEB regressor is lower than that for liabilities
(the same result is reported by Mittelstaedt and
Warshawsky (1993)). The authors interpret this
finding as an indication that OPEB measures are
perceived by the market as less reliable. Choi et al.
then adopt the Barth (1991) approach to estimate
the measurement error (‘noise ratio’) with which
OPEB obligations are impounded in the cross-sec-
tional valuation models. They find that the OPEB
measure exhibits a significantly higher noise ratio
than those of pension obligation measures.
In the early 1990s, the SEC mandated US com-
panies to disclose OPEB liability estimates before
the SFAS 106 recognition requirement took effect
from 1993 onwards. Davis-Friday et al. (1999)
take advantage of this setting and investigate
whether the value-relevance of OPEB measures is
different when they are only disclosed as opposed
to when they are recognised. Their results give ev-
idence that both disclosed and recognised amounts
are valued by the stock market. However, the cor-
relations between the OPEB accounts and share
prices are somewhat stronger for recognised
amounts than for disclosed amounts.
In a subsequent paper, Davis-Friday et al. (2004)
further investigate possible differences in the stock
market impact of disclosed and recognised OPEB
obligations. They apply the methodology of Barth
(1991) and Choi et al. (1997) and compute noise
ratios separately for disclosed and for recognised
OPEB obligations. They find that measurement er-
rors are significantly higher for disclosed than for
recognised amounts, implying that the former are
perceived as less reliable by stock market partici-
pants. They conjecture that imprecise diclosures
during the early phase of application of the FAS
106 disclosure requirements may have contributed
to the higher measurement error. OPEB amounts
that are disclosed but not recognised exhibit high-
er measurement error than pension liabilities.
However, this difference becomes insignificant
once the OPEB obligations are recognised. This
latter finding contrasts with the earlier results of
Choi et al. (1997). Davis-Friday et al. (2004) sug-
gest that this discrepancy may be explained by the
fact that the sample used by Choi et al. contains
both companies that had already adopted FAS 106,
and thus recognised OPEB liabilities, as well as
companies that had not adopted the standard and
therefore only disclosed the obligation.
Value-relevance of pension accounting – 
summary and critical evaluation
In the following, I will summarise what we can
learn from the multitude of empirical studies on
the value-relevance of pension accounting. I will
also address econometrical issues and point out
limitations of the studies. Finally, I will highlight
some areas for further research.
The evidence accumulated so far allows the gen-
eral conclusion that pension accounting measures
as well as measures for OPEB are value-relevant.35
Moreover, related research has shown that pension
accounting measures are also systematically asso-
ciated with corporate bond ratings and spreads
(credit-relevance). Furthermore, it appears that in-
vestors regard not only vested pension claims as
value-relevant but also unvested claims as well as
expected future increases of claims due to salary
increases. However, pension obligations appear to
be priced differently from other, ‘normal’ liabili-
ties. The lower estimates of pricing multiples for
pension obligations in some studies are consistent
with pension accounting measures being less reli-
able (Barth et al., 2001). This is in line with Barth
(1991), Choi et al. (1997) and Davis-Friday et al.
(2004) who find that the markets perceive pension
and OPEB obligation measures as inherently
noisy.
Overall, the results from value-relevance studies
thus support the view that investors perceive com-
panies’ net pension obligations as corporate liabil-
ities, that is, they assume that the obligations from
pension plans lie with the sponsoring companies,
not with legally and economically separate funds.
In that sense, the results support the ‘economic
substance perspective’ on pension plans rather
than the narrower ‘legal form’ interpretation
(Barth, 1991; Gopalakrishnan and Sugrue, 1993).
However, studies on value-relevance as well as on
credit-relevance also indicate that while the capital
market ascribes net pension obligations to spon-
soring companies, it does not view pension sur-
pluses as corporate assets.
Important issues in the debate on pension ac-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 287
35 For summaries of the research on the value-relevance of
other balance sheet or income statement positions, see Barth,
2000; Beaver, 2002. Also see Wyatt (2008) who presents a
comprehensive review of the research on the value-relevance
of financial reporting information on intangible assets.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
s D
ian
 N
us
wa
nto
ro
], 
[R
iri
h D
ian
 Pr
ati
wi
 SE
 M
si]
 at
 20
:04
 29
 Se
pte
mb
er 
20
13
 
counting have been whether balance sheet or in-
come pension measures are more strongly related
to share price valuations, and whether pension ob-
ligations should be measured at fair value or on a
smoothed, long-term basis. With regard to the first
question, empirical studies arrive at conflicting re-
sults. As far as the valuation of pension obligations
is concerned, there is some evidence to support the
view that balance sheet pension measures are more
value-relevant if they are valued at fair value than
if they are smoothed using the ‘corridor’ approach.
Linked to this is the observation that actuarial
gains and losses appear to be incrementally value-
relevant, despite concerns about their reliability.
Thus, the results of empirical research are support-
ive of recent changes in US GAAP pension ac-
counting (and of the IASB’s plans to adopt similar
measures) which have made full recognition of
companies’ pension obligations in the balance
sheet mandatory.
At the same time, Hann et al. (2007a) document
that fair-value based pension cost measures are
highly volatile. Moreover, their study and the re-
cent work of Kiosse et al. (2007) show that recur-
ring pension cost components – service costs,
interest costs, expected returns on plan assets – are
systematically correlated with stock market valua-
tions, whereas the much more volatile fair-value
changes of pension assets and liabilities are not.
Furthermore, according to anecdotal evidence and
survey studies, analysts typically focus more
strongly on income data than on balance sheet data
when estimating companies’ fundamental values
and developing buy or sell recommendations (e.g.
Glaum and Friedrich, 2006). Analysts therefore
have a strong interest in a transparent presentation
of income components that allow them to derive
earnings figures that are persistent and, therefore,
have predictive value (Penman, 2007). All of this
demonstrates that it is important to coordinate fur-
ther changes to US GAAP or IFRS pension ac-
counting rules with the standard-setters’ project on
financial statement presentation.36 In particular,
standard-setters should be concerned not to prom-
ulgate rules that would result in persistent pension
cost components being mixed up with transitory
components since this would reduce the decision-
usefulness of the pension cost information and of
earnings in general.37
As with all empirical research, studies on the
value-relevance of pension accounting face econo-
metric and other methodological problems and
their results therefore have to be interpreted with
care. As has been mentioned, the estimates of re-
gression coefficients in the empirical studies often
do not correspond closely to their theoretical val-
ues (Wagenhofer, 2008). Furthermore, the estima-
tions of the empirical models often result in large
and statistically significant intercept terms even
though the theoretical models do not allow for this.
This indicates that the empirical models are not
correctly specified, possibly due to measurement
error or to missing variables. If missing variables
were correlated with the models’ independent vari-
ables, estimations would be distorted.
A major problem that bedevils value-relevance
studies is the strong multicollinearity of the inde-
pendent variables. While multicollinearity does
not cause biased results, it leads to high standard
errors for regression coefficients whose estimation
thus becomes unreliable, especially when sample
sizes are relatively small. The bivariate correla-
tions between pension and non-pension variables,
between equity and income, between pension lia-
bilities and pension assets (especially in countries
like the US where funding levels are high), and be-
tween pension cost components (service costs and
interest costs), often exceed 0.9. A standard treat-
ment for multicollinearity is to either drop or to ag-
gregate variables, and in many studies pension
assets and pension liabilities are, therefore, re-
placed with net pension assets/liabilities or the net
funding status. However, in doing so, it is implict-
ly assumed that pension assets and pension liabili-
ties have coefficients that are different in sign, but
identical in their absolute magnitude. This as-
sumption is questionable (Landsman, 1986).
Furthermore, if pension assets and liabilities must
be netted in the models due to multicollinearity,
value-relevance studies, at least with regard to US
companies, cannot provide any answers to one of
the most important and intriguing question in pen-
sion accounting – whether a gross or a net presen-
tation of pension assets and liabilities would
produce more decision-useful information.
Other typical problems arising in value-rele-
vance studies are biased coefficient estimates or
heteroscedastic regression errors caused by size
differences between sample companies. In the
presence of heteroscedasticity the standard errors
of coefficients are underestimated, leading to in-
flated t-values. In value-relevance studies, re-
searchers mostly scale independent variables in
order to reduce or avoid these econometric issues.
Different scales have been used (sales, total assets,
number of shares outstanding), which makes direct
comparisons of results across studies difficult.
Furthermore, simulations conducted by Barth and
Kallapur (1996: 529) have shown that deflating
variables with size proxies has ‘unpredictable ef-
fects on coefficient bias, heteroscedasticity, and
estimation efficiency’. Their conclusion is that
econometric problems related to cross-sectional
288 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
36 The IASB acknowledges that both projects are connected
but has decided to treat them separately for practical reasons;
see IASB, 2008a, para 1.21.
37 See PAAinE, 2008, ch. 8, for further discussion on this
point.
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size differences should be treated by using scale
proxies as control variables and by reporting infer-
ences based on White (1980) standard error esti-
mates rather than by deflating.
A further issue, which researchers have not yet
fully disentangled, is the influence of taxation on
the regression coefficients of pension amounts in
value-relevance studies. The impact of taxes on
pension funding decisions and other pension-relat-
ed aspects of corporate finance has been the sub-
ject of several studies (Black, 1980; Tepper, 1981;
Thomas, 1988, Clinch and Shibano 1996; Frank,
2002; Rauh, 2006; Shivdasani and Stefanescu,
2008). However, no consensus has yet emerged as
to how taxes precisely affect the valuation of pen-
sion liabilities or, for that matter, corporate debt in
general within an equilibrium model of asset pric-
ing (also see Fama and French, 1998; Graham,
2000, on this point), or within the framework of
the Ohlson model (Hand, 2001). Only few value-
relevance studies discuss the impact of taxes on re-
gression results in any detail (see, for instance,
Landsman, 1986; Coronado and Sharpe, 2003). In
most studies, tax effects on pension costs are con-
sidered (without deeper discussion) by multiplying
companies’ pre-tax pension costs by one minus the
tax rate. For tax benefits of pension obligations
usually no explicit adjustments are made (an ex-
ception is Coronado and Sharpe, 2003), even
though some authors point out (again mostly with-
out deeper discussion) that the expected regression
coefficient on pension liabilities should fall be-
tween 1 and (1–t), t being the effective marginal
tax rate. Failure to model the tax implications of
pensions explicitly, and likely cross-sectional dif-
ferences in the marginal tax benefits associated
with pension costs, may result in measurement
error and ultimately in biased coefficient esti-
mates.
Another aspect not considered in extant studies
are possible non-linearities in the relation between
pension liabilities and company value that are in-
troduced by pension guarantees provided by the
US Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation
(PBGC) or the UK Pension Protection Fund.38 The
PBGC (or similar institutions in other countries39)
guarantees pension payments from defined benefit
pension plans (often subject to some limits) if they
terminate without sufficient funds and sponsoring
companies fail on their obligations. Effectively,
the PBGC thus sells a ‘put option’ to the compa-
nies’ owners (Sharpe, 1976). This comes in addi-
tion to owners’ general abandonment option. In
situations of extreme financial distress, they can
exercise a put on the companies’ assets and walk
away from their commitments. As companies
come closer to financial distress, the value of these
options increases and the amounts of pension lia-
bilities (or other liabilities) are no longer linearly
associated with company value. It follows that
findings from value-relevance studies could be
distorted if samples included non-trivial numbers
of companies that are in, or close to, financial dis-
tress (Warshawsky, 2003; also see Jin et al. 2006,
on this point). As Barth et al. (1998) have shown,
the value-relevance of balance sheet and income
statement information is influenced by companies’
financial health. For companies approaching fi-
nancial distress, the incremental value-relevance
of balance sheet information increases, while that
of income statement information decreases.
Further limitations of value-relevance studies
are inherent in their methodology. It is not always
clear how to interpret insignificant results. In order
to be value-relevant, accounting information has to
be both relevant and reliable (Barth, 2000; Barth et
al., 2001). If a study comes to the conclusion that
a particular accounting item is not significantly as-
sociated with share prices this can have several
reasons: (i) the item may not be relevant to in-
vestors; (ii) it may be relevant, but investors find
the accounting measure to be too unreliable; or
(iii) the accounting measure lacks both relevance
and reliability. It is not easy in empirical studies to
distinguish between these reasons (Wyatt, 2008).
However, some studies specifically focus on the
degree of measurement error inherent in the value-
relevance relationship (Barth, 1991; Choi et al.,
1997; Davis-Friday et al., 2004), and in other
cases, as Barth (2000: 17) points out, ‘relevance is
a maintained assumption and failure to find that
the item is significantly associated with value is at-
tributed to lack of reliability’.
Another conceptual problem which makes it dif-
ficult for researchers, standard-setters, or other in-
terested parties to interpret results of relative or
incremental association studies is that they are not
based on independent observations. In reality, it is
not possible to create laboratory situations where
investors in one market trade on the basis of only
smoothed pension accounting information, while
in another clearly separated market another group
of investors interact on the basis of fair-value in-
formation only, holding everything else constant.
Instead, what we observe are share prices influ-
enced simultaneously by both types of information
(Holthausen and Watts, 2001; Wagenhofer, 2008).
Finally, results from empirical studies may indi-
cate that a particular accounting item is incremen-
tally value-relevant. However, this does not
necessarily mean that the production and disclo-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 289
38 Holthausen and Watts (2001) also discuss non-linearities
in the relationship between income statement information and
company value arising from conservatism in accounting.
39 Similar institutions exist in other countries, too (e.g. the
Pensionssicherungsverein in Germany). For an overview of
alternative national pension guarantee schemes, see Stewart
(2007).
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sure of this information is desirable because the in-
formation costs incurred by companies are not
taken into account (Wagenhofer, 2008).
4.2. Managerial discretion and earnings 
management in pension accounting
Estimations of net pension obligations and peri-
odic pension costs are based on demographic and
financial assumptions: expectations concerning
employee turnover, mortality rates of pension ben-
eficiaries, future salary and benefit trends, as well
as the interest rate used to discount future pension
payments, and the expected rate of return on plan
assets. It has been noted above that pension liabil-
ities are highly sensitive to changes in actuarial as-
sumptions. Changing the assumption about
employees’ life expectancy by one year, on aver-
age leads to a 3–4% change in the value of pension
liabilities (Coughlan et al., 2007: 7; Blake et al.,
2008: 39). Moreover, a 1% change of the discount
rate will on average decrease or increase the value
of the liability by 15% (May et al., 2005: 1229;
Gohdes and Baach, 2004: 2571). Bayer, a German
chemical company, reports in the notes to its finan-
cial statements 2007, that a reduction of the dis-
count rate of 0.5% would have increased its total
pension obligations by 8.08%, or €1.1bn (Bayer
AG, 2007: 162).
Following FAS 87 (as amended by FAS 158),
companies book actuarial gains and losses against
equity, and under IAS 19 the option still exists to
defer actuarial gains and losses that do not exceed
the corridor. Hence, under the current accounting
standards changes in demographic assumptions or
in the discount rate affect income only over the
long run; immediate income effects are rather
modest. For instance, Bayer reports that a 0.5% re-
duction in the discount rate would increase earn-
ings per year by €12m. A parameter that has a
more pronounced direct impact on earnings is the
expected rate of return on plan assets. Taking once
more Bayer as an example, a raise in the expected
rate of return by 0.5%, multiplied with the compa-
ny’s pension assets of just under €10bn, leads to a
non-trivial increase in earnings of about €50m per
annum (Bayer AG, 2007: 162).
The above numbers demonstrate that the poten-
tial impact of actuarial assumptions on companies’
balance sheet and income figures is economically
significant. Insofar as the accounting for pensions
is tied to funding decisions, changes in actuarial
assumptions can also have cash flow conse-
quences. Determining the actuarial assumptions
involves judgment. In other words, company man-
agement enjoys a certain degree of discretion to set
these paramenters and thereby to influence key fi-
nancial figures such as debt-equity ratios and earn-
ings. This raises the obvious question whether
managers use, or even abuse, their discretion over
pension accounting to influence earnings and other
accounting figures.
Over the past two decades, a large body of liter-
ature has developed that deals with earnings man-
agement. Previous research has identified
capital-market, contracting, regulatory, and taxa-
tion motivations as important reasons for earnings
management (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). For obvi-
ous reasons, it is not easy to document when and
how earnings management takes place in reality.
One approach to investigate possible earnings
management behaviour is to analyse whether man-
agers exercise discretion and explicit accounting
choices in non-neutral ways (Fields et al., 2001).
The approach taken in most studies on accounting
choice is to analyse whether choices can be ex-
plained by cross-sectional differences in company
characteristics linked to incentives for earnings
management. In the context of pension account-
ing, two areas have been researched intensively,
namely motives for the early adoption of FAS 87
in the US in the 1980s and determinants of cross-
sectional differences in actuarial assumptions. In
the following, I will address these two fields of re-
search. In a subsequent section, I will then discuss
some other recent studies that attempt to link the
research on earnings management with that on
market efficiency and on value-relevance.
Early adoption of FAS 87 and actuarial method
changes
The introduction of FAS 87 in the second half of
the 1980s fundamentally changed US GAAP pen-
sion accounting. With the adoption of accrual ac-
counting for pension obligations, companies with
underfunded pension plans had to recognise a
(minimum) pension liability. Furthermore, previ-
ously APB 8 had allowed US companies to use al-
ternative methods to calculate pension liabilities
and periodic pension costs. FAS 87 changed this
by prescribing the application of the projected-
credit-unit method. The deliberations of the
FASB’s pension project took more than a decade,
and even when FAS 87 was issued in 1985, the
FASB allowed for an extended adoption period. In
general, the standard became effective in 1987, but
the application of some provisions (the recognition
of a minimum liability) became mandatory only in
1989. The extended adoption period gave compa-
nies a choice; they could adopt the regulation early,
or postpone adoption until the mandatory date.
A number of studies investigate the motives be-
hind companies’ early adoption of FAS 87. Pre-
FAS 87, in most US companies the accounting for
pension costs was linked to pension contributions,
and companies usually applied ‘cost allocation
methods’ recommended by actuaries (Ghicas,
1990). These methods typically arrived at conser-
vative estimates of pension costs and contribu-
290 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
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tions, because they aimed for a high degree of se-
curity for pension beneficiaries. Thus, in compari-
son to the projected-credit-unit method (a ‘benefit
allocation method’), pension costs tended to be
higher, resulting in the accumulation of plan assets
larger than the present value of expected future
benefits (Ghicas, 1990). In other words, for most
companies the adoption of FAS 87 lead to lower
pension costs and, therefore, increased earnings.
In an early study, Ghicas (1990) identifies 45
companies that between 1980 and 1983 (i.e. before
FAS 87 was issued) switched from a cost alloca-
tion method to a benefit allocation method, an ac-
counting policy change that anticipates FAS 87.
Ghicas matches the ‘switch companies’ with non-
switching companies from the same industries and
develops hypotheses predicting which companies
are more likely to switch. He expects that compa-
nies facing liquidity and financing constraints are
more likely to take advantage of the lower pension
costs associated with a benefit allocation method.
He also expects companies with high funding ra-
tios to adopt the new method so as to lower future
pension contributions. Further, he predicts that
companies with low earnings growth and low cash
flows from operations will attempt to benefit from
lower pension expenses and contributions.
According to another hypothesis, smaller compa-
nies are more prone to switch methods than larger
ones, given that the latter are subject to more in-
tensive public and regulatory scrutiny. Finally,
given that pension contributions can generate tax
benefits, Ghicas predicts that switching companies
have lower effective tax rates than their non-
switching counterparts. Applying a multivariate
logit model, Ghicas finds support for several of his
hypotheses. High funding ratios, high leverage,
and low working capital significantly predict the
pension accounting method switch. He also finds
that switching companies have lower rates of in-
vestment. These findings are consistent with fi-
nancing constraints being a driver of the method
change. Company size, proxying for political and
regulatory costs, is also significant, albeit only
marginally. The effective tax rate, on the other
hand, does not appear to influence the switching
decision.
Subsequent studies by Scott (1991), Langer and
Lev (1993), Ali and Kumar (1994), and Tung and
Weygandt (1994) investigate companies’ motives
for the early adoption of FAS 87.40 Since compa-
nies could delay the recognition of a minimum li-
ability even if they adopted other provisions of
FAS 87, these studies also concentrate on the in-
come effect of the early adoption. Consequently,
the research questions addressed, and the basic
methods applied, are essentially the same as those
of Ghicas (1990). Scott (1991) refines some of the
theoretical arguments. He finds strong support for
political determinants of early adoption (company
size, regulated industries and legal proceedings).
In addition, companies were more likely to adopt
FAS 87 early if the absolute magnitude of the in-
come effect was large and if they had experienced
earnings decreases in prior years. If, on the other
hand, a company’s performance was negative, it
was less likely to adopt early, a finding Scott at-
tributes to so-called ‘big bath’ earnings manage-
ment. Furthermore, he finds that companies were
more likely to adopt FAS 87 early if they had
bonus plans with management compensation
being tied to accounting income. Contrary to the
results of Ghicas (1990), Scott finds only weak ev-
idence for debt constraints to explain companies’
accounting choice.
Ali and Kumar (1994) demonstrate that the mag-
nitude of the income effect is a strong moderator
for other determinants of companies’ choice to
adopt FAS 87 early (also see Scott, 1991, on this
point). In Ali and Kumar’s basic model, debt con-
straints and political arguments do not appear to be
linked significantly with companies’ adoption
choice. However, once the interaction of these
variables with the magnitude of the income effect
of early adoption is included in the models, these
determinants turn out to be significant. The magni-
tude of the income effect also moderates other de-
terminants such as regulatory costs (regulated
industries) and agency costs (earnings-linked man-
agement bonus plans).
The studies referred to so far investigate the
early adoption of pension accounting standards (or
related accounting policy switches) in the US.
Klumpes and Whittington (2003) look into the de-
terminants of UK companies’ pension accounting
method changes. As with US companies in pre-
FAS 87 times, UK companies could, until the in-
troduction of IFRS and IAS 19, choose between
different pension valuation methods. Building on
Ghicas (1990), Klumpes and Whittington survey
UK companies over the years 1994–1998 and
identify 45 companies which switch actuarial
firms, defer reporting of their funding status, or
change from cost-based to market-based valuation
of pension assets. They match these firms with
companies that do not report comparable account-
ing method changes and, like earlier US studies,
apply logistic regression to explain companies’ ac-
counting policy changes. However, the perform-
ance of their models is not very strong. As Forker
(2003) points out, this may be attributable to con-
ceptual and methodological problems inherent in
the research design.
Overall, the research on the early adoption of
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 291
40 Also see the related study by Amir and Ziv (1997) on the
determinants of the early adoption of FAS 106 by US compa-
nies in the years 1991 and 1992.
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pension accounting standards primarily in the US
provides evidence that is consistent with compa-
nies exercising the inherent accounting choices
based on economic incentives. Important determi-
nants appear to be the self-interests of managers
whose remuneration is tied to key financial ac-
counting indicators, debt constraints, and political
and regulatory costs. The importance of these de-
terminants appears to be moderated by the magni-
tude of the earnings effect of the accounting
choice.
Finally, it should be recalled in this context that
current IFRS pension accounting rules present
companies with an option regarding the treatment
of actuarial gains and losses. IAS 19 allows com-
panies to (i) defer and smooth recognition of actu-
arial gains and losses in the balance sheet and in
the income statement by using the corridor ap-
proach; or (ii) to recognise actuarial gains and
losses faster or even fully through the income
statement; or – this is a new option – (iii) to recog-
nise them fully and immediately through equity,
without any income effect. Fasshauer et al. (2008)
survey the 2005 IFRS financial statements of large
stock-listed companies from 20 European coun-
tries. For 265 companies with material defined
benefit pension plans, they find that 136 compa-
nies use the corridor approach, 122 companies use
the new equity recognition option, and seven
(mostly relatively smaller) companies use the in-
come recognition option (also see Morais, 2008a).
Fasshauer et al. show that for companies currently
using the corridor approach a switch to the equity
recognition option would, on average, result in
material balance sheet effects, i.e. recognised pen-
sion liabilities would increase and shareholders’
equity would decrease materially. The income ef-
fect of the switch, on the other hand, would in
most cases be immaterial. It would be very inter-
esting to study further the determinants of compa-
nies’ choice with regard to this important
accounting policy option. In contrast to previous
studies on the early adoption of FAS 87, studies on
the IAS 19 option should focus on the balance
sheet effects, not on the earnings effects.41
Determinants of actuarial assumptions
Several studies attempt to investigate whether
managers of sponsoring companies exploit the
scope they enjoy when setting actuarial assump-
tions in the valuation of pension obligations and
costs. Earlier studies do this by inspecting compa-
nies’ assumptions, and changes of assumptions
over time, and by comparing them to benchmark
variables. More recent studies attempt to explain
the cross-sectional variance in pension valuation
assumptions with company characteristics that are
related to earnings management incentives.
Blankley and Swanson (1995) refer to allega-
tions in the business press and to criticism raised
by the SEC that company management in the US
abuse the discretion inherent in FAS 87 pension
accounting rules. They compare US companies’
pension discount rates and expected rates of return
for the years 1987–1993 with benchmark rates.
They observe that companies do not change dis-
count rates as often as could be expected on the
basis of FAS 87 requirements. Overall, however,
they find discount rates to be in line with bench-
marks. As regards expected rates of return,
Blankley and Swanson conclude that these capture
‘to a surprising degree’ sample companies’ actual
returns. Godwin (1999) also examines trends in
US companies’ actuarial assumptions. He uses
data for 1987–1996 and, unlike Blankley and
Swanson, finds some evidence that companies set
assumptions to manipulate accounting measures.
More precisely, in nine out of the ten sample years
companies with underfunded pension plans had,
on average, higher discount rates than overfunded
companies, consistent with the former choosing
rates that inflate their funded status.
Godwin et al. (1996) investigate whether com-
pany characteristics that proxy for earnings man-
agement motives explain changes in actuarial
pension assumptions over time. The data of this
study relates to US companies during the years
1981–1983. Based on note disclosures required by
FAS 36, the authors categorise companies accord-
ing to the earnings impact of actuarial rate
changes. This categorical variable is then ex-
plained in a cross-sectional setting using ordered
logit regression. Godwin et al. find that companies
are more likely to change assumptions so as to in-
crease earnings when they have experienced earn-
ings decreases in previous years. Furthermore,
earnings increasing assumption changes were sig-
nificantly related to higher leverage, to dividend
constraints, and to declines in taxpayer status (re-
sulting in lower tax benefits of pension expenses).
Amir and Gordon (1996) focus on the assump-
tions US companies apply in the estimation of
their post-employment benefits other than pen-
sions (OPEB). Similar to Godwin et al. (1996),
they derive hypotheses on the determinants of the
cross-sectional differences in companies’ health-
care trend assumptions and discount rates. Their
study is based on data for the years 1991–1993.
The results of the study are not fully consistent,
but the authors find some support for their hy-
potheses that actuarial assumptions are influenced
by the relative size of OPEB obligations, leverage,
and the existence of extreme earnings.
Amir and Benartzi (1998) investigate whether
292 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
41 A first working paper on this issue has been presented by
Morais (2008b). She finds for a sample of European compa-
nies that the IAS 19 option is determined by companies’ coun-
try of origin, size, leverage, and industry.
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cross-sectional variance in companies’ expected
rates of return on pension assets can be explained
by differences in pension fund investment strate-
gies (differing percentages of equity investments).
They argue that, if managers’ assumptions are un-
biased, cross-sectional differences in expected re-
turns can only be explained by differences in the
riskiness of companies’ portfolios. However,
based on a sample of US companies from 1988 to
1994 they find that the correlation between the ex-
pected rate of return and the proportion of equities
in pension funds is rather weak. In contrast to
Blankley and Swanson (1995) according to Amir
and Benartzi’s results, expected rates of return are
not correlated to future returns of pension portfo-
lios even though future returns can be predicted by
the asset composition of funds.
The results of Amir and Benartzi (1998) suggest
that managers use the expected rate of return on
plan assets in biased and possibly opportunistic
ways. The study by Bergstraesser et al. (2006)
takes the investigation one step further and exam-
ines possible incentives for opportunistic behav-
iour. This study also focuses on the expected rate
of return on plan assets. The reason given by the
authors is that companies have more leeway in
their choice of this variable than in setting the dis-
count rate (or the salary and benefit progression
rates) for pension liabilities because accounting
rules on the latter are more prescriptive.42 Their
comprehensive study is based on a total of 20,598
firm-year observations representing 3,350 US
companies for the years 1991–2002. They first in-
vestigate the determinants of companies’ expected
rates of return. Unlike Amir and Benartzi (1998),
they find assumed returns to be correlated with re-
alised, or lagged realised, returns. However, this
effect appears to be rather small. Controlling for
actual returns, Bergstraesser et al. can partially ex-
plain the cross-sectional variation in expected re-
turns with companies’ sensitivities to pension
assumptions, i.e. companies with large amounts of
pension assets (relative to operating earnings or
operating assets) on average are found to have
higher expected returns, all else being equal.
Furthermore, the researchers find evidence consis-
tent with companies making more aggressive re-
turn assumptions in years before, and in years in
which, they engage in merger and acquisition
(M&A) transactions. Companies also appear to set
higher expected rates of return on plan assets in
periods in which seasoned equity offerings take
place and in periods in which CEOs exercise stock
options. The findings of Bergstraesser et al. more-
over indicate that managers are more aggressive
with return assumptions if their companies are
close to failing to meet important earnings thresh-
olds (positive earnings, previous years’ earnings,
median industry earnings). Finally, the authors
find a negative correlation between a ‘corporate
governance index’ and companies’ expected rates
of return on plan assets, that is, managers that are
least constrained by their shareholders appear to
set the highest return assumptions.
Two further studies may be mentioned in this
context. A working paper by Li and Klumpes
(2007) examines the determinants of UK compa-
nies’ expected rates of return on plan assets.
Consistent with the results of US studies they find
that companies’ expected rates of return are signif-
icantly associated with, inter alia, leverage and
pension funding levels, suggesting that contracting
and funding constraints systematically influence
rates of return. Asthana (1999) analyses filings of
US pension funds with the Internal Revenue
Service. Her extensive study is based on 6,040 fil-
ings from 2,419 pension plans sponsored by 1,813
companies for 1990–1992. Her evidence is consis-
tent with companies exercising discretion over ac-
tuarial choices (i.e. choices of actuarial cost
methods and of actuarial assumptions) in order to
manage pension funding and to maximise tax ben-
efits. According to Asthana’s findings, companies
make more conservative (aggressive) choices
when funds become overfunded (underfunded). As
pension contributions increase (decrease) and
come close to maximum tax deductible (minimum
required) contributions, companies make more
conservative (aggressive) choices. The funding-re-
lated actuarial choices are also determined by
companies’ profitability, cash flow from opera-
tions, leverage, and tax payer status.
To summarise, managers have scope for discre-
tion when setting actuarial assumptions in pension
accounting. Overall, the results of the above-dis-
cussed studies suggest that they exercise the dis-
cretion in opportunistic ways. The evidence from
the studies is consistent with managerial choices
regarding pension accounting assumptions being
influenced by funding consequences and related
debt and dividend constraints, tax benefits, and
companies’ efforts to smooth earnings.
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42 Another argument for focusing on the expected return on
pension assets is that it is difficult to appraise assumptions on
salary progression rates, benefit trends and discount rates
without knowledge about the age structure and other demo-
graphic details (e.g. gender structure) of companies’ current
and future pension beneficiaries. These characteristics are im-
portant determinants of the amounts and the timing of future
pension (or health-care) payments, and cross-sectional differ-
ences in companies’ pension assumptions may at least partial-
ly reflect differences in the demographics of companies’
workforces. Thus, failure to control for these variables in stud-
ies on the determinants of actuarial assumptions may lead to
weak or biased results (Landsman, 1996). Unfortunately, cur-
rent reporting standards do not require companies to disclose
information on the demographics of current and past employ-
ees.
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4.3. Managerial discretion in pension accounting,
market efficiency and company valuation
It has been pointed out in the literature that
scope for discretion in financial reporting is not
necessarily a bad thing. If managers use discretion
afforded to them by accounting standards to con-
vey private information about the current state and
the future expected course of the business, this can
improve the information value of financial state-
ments (Schipper, 1989; Dye and Verrechia, 1995;
Healy and Whalen, 1999). However, as shown in
the preceding section, empirical evidence suggests
that managers take advantage of the latitude in
pension accounting standards so as to systemati-
cally manage earnings and other key reporting
numbers. Earnings management can have conse-
quences for different parties and on different lev-
els (e.g. contracting, taxation, regulation). Given
the pivotal role international standard-setters at-
tach to the decision-usefulness of accounting in-
formation for capital market participants, it is of
particular interest to ask whether earnings man-
agement impairs this function of financial report-
ing. If companies were required to fully disclose
how they exercise accounting policy choices, in-
vestors could ‘see through’ opportunistic reporting
behaviour, unravel its effects, and value compa-
nies on the basis of appropriately adjusted ac-
counting measures (Dechow and Skinner, 2000).
If, on the other hand, disclosures are incomplete or
not fully transparent, or if investors for other rea-
sons fail to take into account the consequences of
biased accounting choices, earnings management
is likely to reduce the decision-usefulness of finan-
cial accounting information.
In the following, I will summarise and discuss
empirical studies that investigate, first, to which
degree capital markets are informationally effi-
cient with regard to pension accounting and, sec-
ond, what effect earnings management has on the
value-relevance of pension accounting informa-
tion. Studies that address the latter aspect provide
a link between the two strands of research dis-
cussed separately in prior sectors of this review,
the research on the value-relevance of pension ac-
counting and the research on managerial discretion
in pension accounting.
Pension accounting and information efficiency
The accounting for pensions is complex, and in-
ternational pension accounting standards have
been criticised by analysts because they lead to
‘opaque’, ‘confusing’ and ‘misleading’ reporting.43
Despite this, as shown above, numerous empirical
studies have demonstrated that pension accounting
information is significantly associated with share
prices. This seems to imply that pension account-
ing information is sufficiently relevant and reliable
to be processed by investors. In fact, some authors
explicitly conclude that share prices appropriately
reflect corporate pension accounting information.
For instance, Jin et al. (2006: 22) contend that ‘the
stock market seems to process the available infor-
mation without bias despite the practical difficul-
ties of deciphering corporate pension accounts.’
Other studies, however, raise some doubts whether
capital market participants make full use of the in-
formation available to them and completely under-
stand its implications. For instance, Coronado and
Sharpe (2003) find evidence consistent with in-
vestors naively extrapolating US companies’ ‘pen-
sion earnings’ in the second half of the 1990s; they
conclude that investors are misled and hence ‘do
not appropriately discount pension earnings’.44
A study by Landsman and Ohlson (1990) pro-
duces further evidence which suggests that finan-
cial markets are not fully efficient with regard to
pension accounting information. Their study is
based on data for US companies from 1975–1986.
Controlling for size and several risk factors (betas,
market-to-book, price-earnings ratio), they con-
struct yearly hedge portfolios that are long in com-
panies with large net pension assets (difference
between pension assets and pension liabilities) and
short in companies with small net pension assets.
They find that the portfolios generate significantly
positive returns over subsequent years. The fact
that pension accounting information predicts fu-
ture stock returns is inconsistent with the concept
of market efficiency. Unless the abnormal returns
are, in fact, a premium for unknown risk factors
not taken into account in Landsman and Ohlson’s
study, it appears that investors systematically mis-
price information about companies’ net pension
assets or liabilities.
This latter interpretation is supported by more
recent papers by Franzoni and Marín (2006) and
Picconi (2006). Franzoni and Marín (2006) use a
large dataset of 36,651 company-years, relating to
more than 1,200 US companies for the years
1980–2002. Over most of these years, US compa-
nies were, on average, overfunded. However,
about 40% of the companies per year were under-
funded. The authors concentrate on these compa-
nies and, for each year, assign them to ten
portfolios according to their degree of underfund-
ing. Adjusting for commonly used risk factors,
they find that the most underfunded companies
earn significantly lower returns over several sub-
sequent years than companies with less under-
funded or overfunded pension plans, even though
their returns experience higher standard devia-
tions. The risk-adjusted discount in the return is 
of the order of 10% p.a., i.e. it is economically
294 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
43 See Merrill Lynch (2002); Credit Suisse First Boston
(2005); JP Morgan (2006).
44 Coronado and Sharpe, 2003: 351.
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highly significant. Franzoni and Marín find further
that companies with extreme underfunding are, on
average, underperforming and financially con-
strained small companies with high book-to-mar-
ket ratios (in actuality, one would expect both
factors to be associated with higher, not lower, re-
turns). Franzoni and Marín believe their findings
point to a previously unknown ‘anomaly’ in the fi-
nance literature. They write (Franzoni and Marín,
2006: 953):
‘We interpret this evidence as being due to in-
vestors not paying enough attention to the impli-
cations of the current underfunding for future
earnings and cash flows. The low returns we pre-
dict are, in our view, a consequence of the fact
that investors are systematically surprised by the
negative impact of the pension underfunding on
earnings and cash flows.’
Franzoni and Marín’s findings and conclusions
are reinforced by Picconi (2006). Picconi’s work is
based on 15,553 company-years for US companies
with pension plans for the years 1988–2001. Using
information on changes in PBO, plan assets, and
actuarial assumptions, all of which are disclosed in
companies’ footnotes, Picconi computes expected
future pension cost changes. He then shows that
these ‘informed pension costs changes’ are predic-
tive of future analyst forecast errors. This finding
indicates that analysts fail to immediately incorpo-
rate available information on pension cost changes
in their earnings forecasts. Picconi moreover
demonstrates that hedge portfolios constructed on
the basis of ‘informed pension costs changes’, i.e.
taking long (short) positions in companies with in-
come increasing (decreasing) pension cost
changes, generate significant abnormal returns,
implying that investors also fail to take into ac-
count the publicly available information. Finally,
Picconi regresses future stock market returns on
pension liability measures and standard control
variables. He finds that the PBO and the off-bal-
ance-sheet component of the funding status are
significantly predictive of future returns. That is,
ceteris paribus, companies with high PBOs and
high off-balance-sheet liabilities experience sig-
nificant negative returns in subsequent periods.
On-balance-sheet liabilities, on the other hand, do
not predict future stock returns. Picconi (2006:
951) concludes that ‘investors can completely
process the pension information that has already
been recognised in income, but fail to fully im-
pound the valuation impact of pension liabilities
disclosed only in footnotes’.
To summarise, the empirical studies provide
strong evidence consistent with stock markets not
being fully efficient with regard to pension ac-
counting information. In particular, analysts and
investors seem to have difficulties processing in-
formation about changes in US companies’ pen-
sion positions that is not recognised but only dis-
closed in the notes.
Managerial discretion and value-relevance of
pension accounting information
As explained before, accounting information can
only be value-relevant if it is both relevant and re-
liable. The above-discussed results from studies on
earnings management in pension accounting raise
the question of whether the discretion managers
are afforded impairs the reliability of pension ac-
counting information and, hence, its value-rele-
vance.
Several comments can be made regarding this
point. First, it is important to note that managerial
discretion and possible biases arising from earn-
ings management are not the only source of con-
cern for the reliability of pension accounting
information. The measurement of pension liabili-
ties, pension assets, and pension costs relies on fi-
nancial and demographic assumptions which
require judgment by management. Pension meas-
ures are also subject to short-term market parame-
ter changes (discount rates, fair values of pension
assets). In practice, these factors cause measure-
ment error and uncertainty, thus also reducing reli-
ability.
Second, relevance and, especially, reliability are
no absolute concepts. That is, accounting informa-
tion can be more or less reliable, and measures
may still be decision-useful when their reliability
is less than perfect. However, one would expect
more reliable measures to be more decision-useful
and thus more strongly associated with stock mar-
ket valuations than less reliable measures. Thus,
holding everything else constant, in standard em-
pirical models one would expect the standard devi-
ation of estimated coefficients to be smaller for
more reliable measures, hence their significance
level to be higher. Furthermore, in relative associ-
ation studies estimations with more reliable meas-
ures should have higher explanatory power than
estimations with less reliable measures, again all
else being equal (Hann et al., 2007b).
Third, however, in reality ‘all else’ is usually not
equal. In particular, as standard-setters point out
there can be trade-offs between relevance and reli-
ably in accounting. For instance, fair-value meas-
ures are often thought to be more relevant to
decision-makers than traditional cost measures,
while being less reliable. Therefore, differences in
estimated coefficients in value-relevance studies
can be attributable to differences in relevance, re-
liability, or both. As Wyatt (2008) points out, it is
difficult to disentangle the separate effects in em-
pirical studies. This holds even more for efforts to
single out the reliability effect of managerial dis-
cretion in value-relevance studies. Thus, it is not
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surprising that only few studies directly address
this issue.
In a paper unrelated to pension accounting,
Marquardt and Wiedman (2004) analyse the value-
relevance of financial accounting information for a
sample of companies that issue secondary stock
and therefore face strong incentives to manage
earnings. The authors first document evidence
consistent with SEO companies managing their
earnings. Furthermore, they find that the value-rel-
evance of companies’ accounting information is
significantly lower for years in which they offer
stock than in prior or later years; in the SEO year,
coefficients on net income, and adjusted R2s of
valuation equations, are lower than in other years.
These findings are consistent with investors being
aware of companies’ earnings management and
correcting for the perceived bias in published ac-
counting figures. Marquardt and Wiedman’s find-
ings are corroborated by another paper by Baber et
al. (2006). These authors apply an event-study
methodology and also find evidence consistent
with capital-market participants taking earnings
management into account when using financial ac-
counting data.45
There is one published paper and two as yet un-
published working papers that directly investigate
the effects of managerial discretion on the value-
relevance of pension accounting information.
Hann et al. (2007b) estimate a ‘non-discretionary’
PBO (PBO-X) measure for a sample of US com-
panies by replacing companies’ actual discount
rates and expected rates of salary progression with
respective industry medians. They define the dif-
ference between companies’ reported PBOs and
PBO-X as estimates of the discretionary PBO
component (PBO-D), and they investigate whether
PBO-D is value-relevant. Their empirical analysis
is based on a sample of 12,567 company-years re-
lated to 1,707 US companies for the years
1991–2003. Using an empirical version of the
Ohlson model (augmented with additional control
variables), they find that valuation equations with
reported PBO and with the estimated non-discre-
tionary PBO measure have the same explanatory
power, and the two estimated regression coeffi-
cients are not statistically different. Moreover, fur-
ther tests indicate that PBO-D is incrementally
value-relevant over PBO-X and that the coeffi-
cients on PBO-X and PBO-D are not statistically
different.46
As Hann et al. themselves point out, there are at
least two interpretations for these findings. First,
they may be due to the fact that managers do not
abuse the discretion inherent in US GAAP pension
accounting and that their choices of assumptions
instead convey value-relevant information to stock
market participants. Alternatively, it could also be
that investors uncritically fixate on published 
pension accounting figures without properly eval-
uating the differing value-relevance of non-discre-
tionary and the discretionary components of the
PBO. Hann et al. (2000b) lean towards the first in-
terpretation, and they provide additional robust-
ness checks that appear to refute alternative
explanations.
A working paper by Brown (2006) arrives at dif-
ferent results. His work is also based on a large
sample of US companies for the years 1991–2001.
He compares companies’ discount rates and salary
progression rates with respective benchmarks; the
sum of the two differences can be thought of as a
measure for the aggressiveness of companies’ pen-
sion assumptions. Using a cross-sectional balance
sheet valuation model (augmented with further
control variables), Brown finds that the coefficient
on the aggressiveness measure is significantly
negative, indicating that share prices of companies
with aggressive pension assumptions are systemat-
ically reduced. In a further model specification
similar to that of Hann et al. (2007b), Brown re-
gresses both reported PBO and PBO-D (as well as
other balance sheet and control variables) on share
prices. He finds PBO-D to be incrementally value-
relevant over the reported PBO. He concludes that
investors see through managers’ opportunistic pen-
sion accounting choices and adjust company valu-
ations accordingly. Brown’s results are in conflict
with those of Hann et al. (2007b). One possible
reason for the discrepancy may be differences in
the methods used in the two studies. In fact,
Coronado and Sharpe (2003) argue that Brown’s
results should be interpreted with caution because
they are based on a pure balance sheet model that
does not take into account information on compa-
nies’ pension costs.
Davis-Friday et al. (2007) concentrate on a spe-
cial feature of FAS 87 that allows companies to
smooth their reported returns on plan assets.
According to FAS 87, para. 30, the expected rate
of return may be multiplied with either the fair
value of plan assets or with a ‘smoothed fair
value’, i.e. a moving average of plan asset fair val-
ues. Davis-Friday, Miller and Mittelstaedt show
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45 A study by Barth et al. (1996) on the value-relevance of
fair values of financial instruments in the banking industry
presents another example for the importance investors attach
to the reliability of reported accounting information. They find
that fair values of loans are value-relevant only for banks with
above-median levels of regulatory capital, not for banks with
below-median levels, i.e. where managers have an incentive to
bias estimates of loan fair values upwards.
46 One can point out again a related finding from the study
of Fasshauer and Glaum (2008) who show that for their sam-
ple of German companies the non-recognised parts of compa-
nies’ funding status, i.e. mostly actuarial gains and losses not
recognised because of the corridor approach, are incremental-
ly value-relevant over recognised smoothed corridor net liabil-
ities.
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for their sample of about 200 US companies for
the years 1998–2001 that most companies use
smoothed fair values in the calculation of expect-
ed returns on plan assets. However, the degree of
smoothing, i.e. the deviation from fair-value-based
returns, differs across companies. Davis-Friday et
al. show that the use of smoothed fair values can
have material effects on companies’ earnings, and
they investigate whether investors detect and cor-
rect for the smoothing. They calculate the differ-
ence between reported returns on plan assets
(calculated on the basis of smoothed fair values)
and returns on the basis of fair values. Using a 
version of the Ohlson model, they then analyse
whether this difference is incrementally value-rel-
evant. They find mixed results. For the pooled
sample, the difference between smoothed expected
returns and fair-value expected returns is signifi-
cantly associated with share prices. However, in
annual regressions the relationship is significant
only in some years and for some of the regression
techniques applied. In an additional model, annual
changes in the differences between smoothed and
fair-value expected returns are not significantly as-
sociated with annual stock returns. The authors
conclude that overall their results provide ‘mixed
to limited support’ that investors see through com-
panies’ earnings smoothing and appropriately ad-
just share valuations.
Taken together, the evidence on the effect mana-
gerial discretion has on the value-relevance of pen-
sion accounting is inconclusive. Hann et al.
(2007b) find that investors do not discriminate be-
tween the non-discretionary and the discretionary
components of the PBO. They interpret this as in-
dicating that managers use their discretion in pen-
sion accounting to ‘provide valuable information
to the market about the underlying economics of
the pension obligation’ (Hann et al. (2007b: 119).
This interpretation appears to be in conflict with
above-discussed studies that suggest that man-
agers’ pension accounting choices are influenced
by opportunistic incentives. In direct contrast to
Hann et al. (2007b), Brown (2006) finds that in-
vestors do discriminate between the non-discre-
tionary and the discretionary PBO components,
i.e. place a lower value on companies if managers
choose aggressive, obligation-reducing pension
accounting assumptions. Finally, Davis-Friday et
al. (2007) find only weak support for their hypoth-
esis that investors adjust for companies’ smoothing
of expected returns on plan assets. The basic as-
sumption underlying all three studies is that in-
vestors are able to ‘see through’ managers’
opportunistic pension accounting choices and ac-
cordingly adjust the valuation of shares. This as-
sumption, however, seems to conflict with the
findings of Landsman and Ohlson (1990),
Franzoni and Marín (2006), and Picconi (2006)
which suggest that markets are not fully efficient
with regard to pension accounting information,
presumably because current pension accounting
rules are highly complex and investors are not able
to adequately process the detailed disclosures in
the notes to companies’ financial statements.
Clearly, further research is needed to shed more
light on the impact of managerial discretion on the
usefulness of pension accounting information.
5. Research on pension accounting: an 
international perspective
As this review has shown, the existent empirical
research on pension accounting is almost com-
pletely based on US data. Only a handful of stud-
ies have been conducted with non-US data, and
these are mostly based on UK or Canadian data –
in other words, they also relate to Anglo-Saxon
countries with accounting standards, pension sys-
tems and capital market institutions similar to
those of the US. This raises the question whether
the evidence from US-based studies on value-
relevance and on earnings management can be
generalised to other countries, especially to non-
Anglo-Saxon countries.
There are several reasons why results from US-
based pension accounting research may not hold
for other countries. One can differentiate general
factors impeding the comparability of capital-mar-
kets-oriented accounting research across countries,
and factors specific to pension accounting.
Starting with general factors regarding the relation
between accounting information and securities
valuation, it is conceivable that capital markets are
not fully integrated globally and price formation
varies across regional segments as a result of, for
example, differing risk attitudes or time prefer-
ences, differential taxation, or other legal differ-
ences (e.g. La Porta et al., 2002; Kwok and
Tadesse, 2006; Hail and Leuz, 2006).
Second, over time and in response to historical
and other institutional factors, accounting systems
have developed differently in different countries.
National accounting standards diverge with re-
spect to recognition, valuation and disclosure
rules, and this is likely to be reflected in the rela-
tionship between accounting data and share prices.
For instance, Joos and Lang (1994) show that re-
ported accounting profitability measures, and mul-
tiples applied to them in the stock markets, differ
considerably for French, German and UK compa-
nies over the course of the 1980s, despite
European efforts to harmonise accounting.
Furthermore, it is increasingly recognised in the
literature that the ‘quality’ of financial accounting
information is not only determined by accounting
standards, but also by companies’ legal and other
institutional environments (e.g. Bushman and
Piotroski, 2006). Differences in legal systems, in
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 297
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taxation, or in remuneration practices, can give
rise to different incentives for earnings manage-
ment across countries. Limitations put on manage-
rial discretion also vary. For instance, in the US 
the application of accounting standards by listed
corporations is enforced by the SEC, a public insti-
tution endowed with far-reaching legal, adminstra-
tive and judicial rights. In Europe, capital market
oversight is a national matter and therefore hetero-
geneous. In some European countries where stock
markets traditionally play a relatively minor role,
enforcement mechanisms until recently were not
highly developed (FEE, 2001). A number of em-
pirical studies provide evidence consistent with
the degree of earnings management differing be-
tween countries (e.g. Leuz et al., 2003; Glaum 
et al., 2004; Burgstahler et al., 2006; Daske et al.,
2006). On a more general level, results from sev-
eral other studies suggest that important properties
of companies’ earnings, such as timeliness, conser-
vatism, and value-relevance, also differ across
countries, in particular depending on the origin of
countries’ legal systems and the degree of investor
protection that is associated with it (e.g. Ali and
Hwang, 2000; Ball et al., 2000; Hung, 2001).
So far, I have mentioned general factors, i.e. fac-
tors not specific to pension accounting, that may
prevent the generalisation of US-based capital-
markets-oriented accounting research. Table 1 is
an attempt to summarise national accounting stan-
dards for the accounting for pension benefits in the
US, the UK, and in six Continental European
countries.47 The overview documents that national
pension accounting rules vary (also see Morais,
2008a, on this point). While UK and Dutch pen-
sion accounting rules are similar to IAS 19 and
FAS 87, French, German, Italian, Spanish and
Swiss rules are clearly different. For example, in
German accounting law, there are no explicit rules
for the valuation of pension obligations,48 and
French and Swiss accounting standards do not
generally require the recognition of pension liabil-
ities. Furthermore, disclosure rules also vary
across countries, with requirements generally
being much less extensive in Continental Europe
than in Anglo-Saxon countries, or in comparison
to IFRS. The lack of precise rules for the recogni-
tion and valuation of pension obligations and pen-
sion costs, combined with relatively lenient
disclosure requirements, opens up wide scope for
managerial discretion and earnings management.
As a consequence, it is likely that both the rele-
vance and the reliability of pension accounting in-
formation will vary across countries.
Following the European Union’s IFRS
Regulation of 19 July 2002, all publicly traded
companies in the European Union are required, in
most cases since 2005, to prepare their consolidat-
ed financial statements in accordance with IFRS.
Hence, the above-discussed national accounting
standards have lost their importance for stock list-
ed companies, the focus of most empirical studies.
Hence, since IAS 19 is very similar to FAS 87, one
could expect pension accounting, in particular, to
have become homogeneous, or at least very simi-
lar, for European and US stock-listed companies.
However, as pointed out by Ball (2006) and Nobes
(2006), there are serious reasons to expect that the
very different institutional environments across
Europe will continue to bring about country-spe-
cific accounting practices, despite the introduction
of a single set of accounting standards. These con-
cerns appear to be corroborated by Glaum et al.
(2007). In a working paper, they provide evidence
that suggests that the degree of compliance with
IFRS mandated disclosures differs systematically
across European countries. An earlier survey study
by Ernst & Young (2006) also concluded that IFRS
implementation across Europe is heterogeneous
and country-specific.
An interesting example of heterogeneity pertain-
ing to pension accounting has been identified by
Verrall et al. (2005). The authors analyse life ex-
pectancy assumptions used by actuaries in corpo-
rate pension liability calculations in the US, in
Canada, and in 14 European countries. International
pension accounting standards are silent on which
mortality assumptions companies should use;
moreover, there is no requirement for companies
to disclose which assumptions they do use. The
study by Verrall et al. reveals that mortality as-
sumptions vary systematically across countries,
much more so than actually observed life ex-
pectancies. In some countries, different mortality
tables are used; in other countries only one table is
accepted. While differing life expectancies of men
and women are mostly taken into account, Danish
and Swedish actuaries apply ‘unisex’ tables. A fur-
ther, important difference lies in the fact that some
mortality tables do incorporate projections of ex-
pected future improvements in life expectancy,
while tables used in other countries (e.g. Belgium,
Norway) only relate to past mortality, without any
improvement allowance. As depicted in Figure 1,
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47 The information presented in Table 1 must be interpreted
with caution. Pension accounting rules are complex, and any
attempt to summarise and compare national pension account-
ing rules necessarily leads to a loss of detail and precision.
Hence, Table 1 can only provide a general overview of the
most salient properties of the respective national GAAP.
48 Traditionally, companies that prepare financial statements
according to German GAAP follow pension accounting rules
stipulated by the German tax code. Hence, they discount ex-
pected future benefits with a rate of 6% p.a.; expected future
salaries are not taken into account. The German government
has recently introduced a bill that would change the German
Commercial Code and require a market-oriented valuation of
pension obligations. It is estimated that, as a consequence,
pension liabilities reported under German GAAP might in-
crease by more than 50%. See Pellens et al. (2008).
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the assumed life expectancy in the calculation of
pension liabilities in Denmark is equal to the ob-
served national population life expectancy, that is,
no allowance is made for improvements in life ex-
pectancy or longevity risk. Assumed life expectan-
cies in Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands,
and in the US, are also not much higher than cur-
rently observed mortality rates. On the other hand,
in the UK, Ireland, Spain and France, rather high
life expectancy assumptions are used. As a result,
estimations of corporate pension liabilities differ
systematically across countries – PBOs are sys-
tematically higher in the UK, Ireland, Spain, and,
especially, in France, and lower in the US, in the
Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, and Denmark
– even though on the surface all companies follow
the same (or very similar) pension accounting
rules (IAS 19, FAS 87).49
It would be interesting to investigate whether in-
vestors are aware of these systematic differences
and adjust company valuations accordingly. If so,
one would expect to find country-specific valua-
tion multiples attached to pension liabilities in
cross-country value-relevance studies. All else
being equal, regression coefficients on pension li-
abilities should be higher for Danish, Swiss,
German, Dutch and US companies than for UK,
Irish, Spanish and French companies. However,
given that companies do not disclose mortality as-
sumptions, it seems questionable whether in-
vestors can correct for these differences. Hence, in
an international context, the differences may con-
tribute to measurement error and noise in the rela-
tion between pension accounting information and
stock market valuations.
Finally, as noted before, corporate pension sys-
tems differ across countries. This may affect how
companies account for pension obligations, and it
may have bearings on the way pension accounting
information is processed by investors and other
users of financial statements. Table 2 summarises
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 299
Figure 1
Difference between observed general population future life expectancy and typically assumed future
life expectancy of company pension scheme members (male, aged 65)
Source: Verrall et al. (2005: 190).
49 The differences in mortality rates have material valuation
effects. Based on further assumptions, Verrall et al. calculate
that the difference between the low mortality rates applied in
Denmark and the much higher ones in France are equivalent
to a difference in the pension accounting discount rate of more
than 2%; see Verrall et al., 2005: 195–196.
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Table 1
National pension accounting rules: overview
France Italy Netherlands Spain
1. Specific standard for no; recommendation, but no; Codice Zivile, paragraph Dutch Accounting Standard yes, new rules to be applied
pension accounting no obligation to apply 21.20 applies only to (RJ 271); alternatively, as of January 2008; special
IAS 19 (however: severence payments companies may opt to apply rules for financial institutions
application of SoRIE (TFR); no specific rules IAS 19 or FAS 87; it is also
option not allowed) for defined benefit allowed to adopt IFRS
obligations (which are completely on a voluntary 
uncommon in Italy) basis; DB pensions in multi-
employer funds may be 
accounted for as DC plans; 
new Dutch standard 271 to 
be published in 2009
2. Recognition in the balance sheet
2.1. Recognition of liability recognition of liability for n.a. (see 1) yes yes
mandatory pension obligations is not
mandatory; if companies
recognise a liability,
application of IAS 19 is
recommended (without
SoRIE option); in case 
of voluntary recognition, 
IAS 19 defines minimum 
liability
2.2. smoothing mechanism n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) corridor approach (optional; until 2007: same as IFRS,
for balance sheet SORIE option not allowed immediate recognition in
under RJ 271) P&L was common practice;
since January 2008: only
SORIE option allowed
2.3. Presentation in balance n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) net net
sheet (gross/net)
3. Valuation of liabilities
3.1. Specified method n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) yes; projected unit credit no; recommended;
method projected unit credit method
3.2. Guidance on n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) yes no
assumptions
3.3. Interest rate n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) yes, market based no, actuarially determined
3.4. Salary rate n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) yes no, actuarially determined
3.5. Benefit rate n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) yes no, actuarially determined
3.6. Mortality rate n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) no, actuarially determined no, actuarially determined
4. Valuation of assets same as IAS 19: n.a. (see 1) fair value, or allocated fair fair value
fair value value for joint, multi-
employer pension funds
5. Pension costs
5.1. Explicit rules n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) yes yes (but only SORIE
approach for actuarial gains
and losses)
5.2. Smoothing mechanism n.a. (see 2.1) n.a. (see 1) corridor (optional) only for prior service costs
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Switzerland UK Germany IFRS US
yes, FER 16 and 26 FRS17 ‘Retirement currently only rudimentary IAS 19 ‘Employee FAS 87/158 ‘Employers’
Benefits’ rules in German Commercial Benefits’ Accounting for Pensions’
Code (HGB), paragraph 
249 and paragraph 253; 
reform of HGB in 
preparation, planned: 
market-based valuation of 
pension obligations
no; only if pension fund is yes yes, if internally financed yes yes
actuarially underfunded (except for liabilities
originated pre-1985);
optional for funding deficits
in case of external financing
yes, due to actuarial no no corridor (optional) no
valuation
net net in case of plan assets gross (net in case of net in case of plan assets net in case of plan assets
funding through separate
legal units)
no, actuarially determined yes, projected unit credit no, mostly entry age normal yes; projected unit credit yes; projcted unit credit
method cost method method method
(‘Teilwertverfahren’) or
projected unit credit method
no yes yes yes yes
no, actuarially determined yes, market-based, high no explicit rule; traditionally yes, market-based, high yes market-based, high
quality corporate bonds adoption of interest rate quality corporate bonds quality corporate bonds
specified in tax code 6% p.a.
no, actuarially determined yes no projections required yes yes
no, actuarially determined yes no projections required yes yes
no, actuarially determined no, actuarially determined no, actuarially determined no, actuarially determined no, actuarially determined
fair value fair value cost; fair value or actuarial fair value fair value
value in case of external
financing
no yes no yes yes
yes, implicit in actuarial no yes, implicit in traditional corridor (optional) corridor (optional)
valuation (tax-based) valuation
practices
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Table 2
National pension systems: overview
France Germany Italy
Public pension systems1 two-tier pension system; private sector employees most private sector employees are
earnings-related public are covered by earnings- covered by Italian social security
pension as part of the basic related pension as part of system (INPS); public pension
social security system plus the basic social security system was radically reformed in
mandatory industry-wide system, financed through 1995; traditionally, at the time of
pension schemes, based contributions of employers termination of employment, all
on a points system, financed and employees; civil Italian employees were entitled to
through contributions of servants receive a state a severance payment (TFR),
employers and employees pension, based on final- based on career-long earnings,
pay level protected against inflation, for
which companies had to set up
book reserves; following pension
reform, employees can transfer
TFR funds to new pension plans
Supplementary occupational pension systems2 voluntary, supplementary supplementary company voluntary, supplementary
company pension systems pension systems are company pension systems are
are not widespread; in most common, in some industries not widespread; recent law
cases, they are for top based on collective agree- changes (fiscal incentives) are
executives only, in some ments; traditionally, only expected to foster corporate
cases they are extended to DB plans were allowed, in pension systems; all new
all executives, in only a few most cases on career-average schemes are DC plans
cases to all employees; most or on final-year basis; since
plans are DC; due to tax 2001, hybrid DC forms with
restrictions, DB benefits minimum guaranteed returns
cannot vest before retirement; are allowed and in many
DB plans do not have to be cases replace DB plans;
externally financed; DC plans traditionally, most DB plans
have to be financed through were not externally funded
insurance policies (book reserves only); in
recent years external 
funding through contractual
trust arrangements have 
become common for larger 
companies; national 
insurance system for vested 
rights (PSV)
Prevalence of supplementary occupational 10% 57% 8%
pension plans3
Distribution of occupational pension DC: 45% DC: 10% DC: 100%
systems4 DB: 15% DB: 50% DB: 0%
Hybrid: 40% Hybrid: 40% Hybrid: 0%
Funding status of DB plans (average for 65% 50% 30%
leading stock-listed companies, 2005)5
Distribution of retiree income6 Pillar 1: 51%7 Pillar 1: 82%8 Pillar 1: 75%9
Pillar 2: 34% Pillar 2: 5% Pillar 2: 2%
Pillar 3: 15% Pillar 3: 13% Pillar 3: 23%
Sources and explanations:
1 DIA (1999); Natali (2004); Börsch-Supan and Wilke (2006); OECD (2007)
2 Natali (2004);  Mercer (2006); OECD (2007); personal enquiries
3 OECD (2007)
4 Mercer (2006)
5 Fashauer, Glaum and Street (2008); for US (2006 data); Standard and Poor’s (2007)
6 Pillar 1: public pension system, Pillar 2: occupational pension system, Pillar 3: private pension system
7 Deutsche Bank Research (2003a) (Pillar 2: including mandatory occupational pensions)
8 DIA (1999); Deutsche Bank Research (2003a)
9 Deutsche Bank Research (2003b)
10 Deutsche Bank Research (2003a)
11 DIA (1999); Deutsche Bank Research (2003a); Deutsche Bank Research (2003b)
12 Deutsche Bank Research (2003a); Deutsche Bank Research (2003b)
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Netherlands Spain Switzerland UK US
all employees are covered all employees are covered public pension as part of complex pension system most employees are
by basic, flat-rate public by earnings-related public the basic social security mixing public and private covered by earnings-related
pension system pension as part of the system, flat-rate plus components; first-tier: flat- public pension as part of
Spanish social security career-average earnings- rate basic state pension as the social security system
system related benefit part of social security
system; second tier:
earnings-related public
pension, but will shortly
transition to a flat-rate top-
up to the basic state pension;
companies are allowed to
establish private pension
plans and contract their
employees out of the second
tier of the public system;
employees are also allowed
to contract out to join private
pension schemes
based on industrial-relations supplementary company by law, all employers a high proportion of employees, supplementary company
agreements, most employees pension plans are have to provide pension especially those of larger pension systems are
are covered by industry-wide sponsored mainly by plans; some pension plans companies, are covered by common; traditionally,
or company-specific large, multinational are DB, but most (and company pension plans, many most plans were final-
occupational schemes; mostly companies with high increasingly) plans are of which are contracted out of salary-related DB; recently,
plans are career-average proportions of highly hybrid DC plans, with the second-tier public system; many companies have
DB plans, in some cases paid employees; in some guaranteed minimum traditionally, most plans were closed DB plans for new
(increasingly) DC or hybrid; cases, corporate pension interest rate set by Federal final-salary DB; recently, many entrants; plans for new
according to law, DB plans plans are provided based Council; pension plans DB plans have been closed for entrants are mostly DC;
must be fully funded; most on industry-wide collective must be funded on actuarial new entrants, plans for new financing of DB plans
DB plans are financed agreements; traditionally, basis; financing mostly entrants are mostly DC; mostly through trustees
through industry-wide (in pension plans were DB; through separate funds financing is mostly through (mostly banks); since 1974,
some cases, occupational) more recently adopted (foundations), sometimes trusts, sometimes contract-based minimum funding required
pension funds; by law, plans are often DC or on multi-employer basis; (but, from 2012, contracting-out by law (ERISA), DB
companies in the industry hybrid; in the past, DB often companies provide on a DC basis will cease and obligations are insured
are required to participate plans often were not pension plans with benefits members of affected plans will through national pension
unless they set up a company- externally funded (book that exceed the mandatory automatically rejoin state benefit guarantee company
specific plan that offers reserves only); since 2002, benefits, pension benefits second-tier system); since 1997, (PBGC)
employees better terms than with few exceptions, all are insured through public minimum funding for DB plans
industry-wide scheme DB plans have to be funded guarantee fund (BVG) required; since 2004, DB
through qualifying pension obligations are insured through
funds or insurance policies national pension protection fund
(PPF)
> 90% 10% > 90% 43% 47%
DC: 8% DC: 80% DC: 0% DC: 18% DC: 60%
DB: 82% DB: 10% DB: 14% DB: 18% DB: 30%
Hybrid: 10% Hybrid: 10% Hybrid: 86% Hybrid: 64% Hybrid: 10%
73% 81% 63% 95% 98%
Pillar 1: 50%8 Pillar 1: 92%10 Pillar 1: 42%11 Pillar 1: 65%12 Pillar 1: 45%12
Pillar 2: 40% Pillar 2: 4% Pillar 2: 32% Pillar 2: 25% Pillar 2: 13%
Pillar 3: 10% Pillar 3: 4% Pillar 3: 26% Pillar 3: 10% Pillar 3: 42%
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important features of the public and occupational
pension systems of the US, the UK, and of six
Continental European countries.50 The overview
shows that occupational systems play very differ-
ent roles in different countries. In some countries,
corporate pensions are widespread, either on a vol-
untary basis (e.g. Germany, the UK), or due to col-
lective industrial-relations agreements (e.g. the
Netherlands), or because of legal requirements
(e.g. Switzerland); their importance is much lower
in other countries (France, Italy, Spain), at least
traditionally. In the Netherlands, in Switzerland, in
the UK and, to a lesser degree, in the US, occupa-
tional pensions contribute substantially to retiree
incomes.
More importantly from the viewpoint of ac-
counting, characteristics of occupational pension
systems differ across countries. Traditionally, de-
fined benefit arrangements have been dominant in
most countries, even though more recently they
are often replaced by defined contribution or hy-
brid schemes (Kiosse and Peasnell, 2009).
However, in some countries (e.g. Germany,
Switzerland) pure defined contribution plans are
legally not possible because sponsoring companies
must at least guarantee a minimum investment re-
turn on contributions. Thus, according to IAS 19,
pension schemes in these countries are defined
benefit schemes.51
There are pronounced differences in funding
practices across countries. In particular, US and
UK corporate pensions plans, on average, are high-
ly funded, often overfunded. For instance, in 2006,
the average funding ratio for companies compris-
ing the S&P 500 index was 98% (see Table 2), and
in the 1990s, average funding ratios at times even
exceeded 100% (e.g. Coronado and Sharpe, 2003).
In other countries, funding ratios are often much
lower. For example, as shown in Table 2 the aver-
age funding ratio of large German companies was
44% in 2005, and Fasshauer and Glaum (2008)
find even lower ratios for a broader sample of
German companies for the late 1990s and early
2000s (average: 26.14%; median: 10.06%).52
Variation in funding ratios is partly a result of
differences in pension fund regulation: some coun-
tries require pension plans to be funded, either
fully or at some minimum level (e.g. US, UK, the
Netherlands, Spain), whereas such requirements
do not exist in other countries (e.g. France,
Germany). Another driving factor is taxation. For
instance, in the US only contributions to funded
pension schemes are tax deductable (McGill et al.,
2005), and incentives exist for companies to fund
pension plans fully. This is because firms’ contri-
butions to funds are tax deductible, whereas earn-
ings in pension funds are tax exempt (e.g. Francis
and Reiter, 1987). Tax regulation can be different
in other countries, setting different funding incen-
tives. For example, until recently tax and other
regulations in Germany actually discriminated
against external funding. This particular legal set-
ting, purposefully designed to foster internal fi-
nancing, helps to explain why corporate pensions
traditionally have been, and in some cases contin-
ue to be, completely unfunded in German compa-
nies.
Institutional differences between national occu-
pational pension systems can have consequences
for how pension obligations are accounted for by
preparers of financial statements and for how in-
vestors process reported pension accounting meas-
ures. Previous studies have shown that US
companies’ pension accounting choices (early
adoption of FAS 87, demographic and financial as-
sumptions) are influenced, inter alia, by taxation
motives and by liquidity and debt constraints
(Ghicas, 1990; Ali and Kumar, 1994; Godwin et
al., 1996; Asthana, 1999). However, differences in
national taxation and funding regulations may 
result in different incentives for pension-related
earnings management. For instance, while under-
funding in the US under certain conditions obliges
companies to increase pension contribution over
subsequent years, this is not the case if funding is
not mandatory. Hence, short-term liquidity con-
straints are unlikely to be a determinant of German
or French companies’ pension accounting behav-
iour.
Findings from the study by Franzoni and Marín
(2006) indicate that investors may not fully under-
stand the consequences of pension underfunding
for future earnings and cash flows of US compa-
nies and that, therefore, prices of strongly under-
funded US companies are systematically biased.
304 ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
50 The same caveat applied to Table 1 also applies here:
National pension systems are complex, and any attempt to
compare them in a table is bound to lead to a loss of detail and
precision. In particular, the data on the distribution of retiree
income must be treated cautiously. It is compiled from vari-
ous sources that are based on different methods and time pe-
riods. It can, therefore, only provide a general sense of the
relative importance of public pensions, occupational pen-
sions, and retiree income from private savings, in the respec-
tive countries.
51 According to IAS 19, para. 7, all pension plans that do not
meet the strict definition of a defined contribution plan are 
defined benefit plans (also see para. 24–27, in particular, 
para. 26(b), on guaranteed minimum returns on contributions).
In its recent pension accounting discussion paper, the IASB ad-
mits that this simple distinction is not adequate. The IASB con-
siders developing a new set of definitions and new rules for the
recognition and valuation for defined contribution pension
promises which, broadly speaking, will be based on the fair-
value principle. For details, see IASB, 2008a, in particular ch. 7.
52 It should be pointed out that the average funding ratios
shown in Table 2 are based on data for large, multinational
corporations. These companies often operate pension plans
not only in their respective home countries but in many coun-
tries around the world. Therefore, it is likely that the average
funding ratios displayed actually downplay existing cross-
country differences.
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The same study reveals that strongly underfunded
US companies tend to be small underperforming
companies with high book-to-market ratios. As
with the funding-related results from earnings
management studies, these findings may be specif-
ic to a regulatory environment with mandatory
funding of pension plans, i.e. they may not hold in
countries where funding is not mandatory and
where underfunding, therefore, has no immediate
cash flow consequences.
Finally, institutional differences, e.g. differ-
ences in pension taxation, guarantee schemes, and
funding regulation, may also influence the associ-
ation between pension accounting measures and
securities prices. As has been discussed above, the 
failure of most previous pension value-relevance
studies to take tax benefits into consideration is
likely to have led to measurement error and, pos-
sibly, to biased results. This problem would be ex-
acerbated in an international context where tax
benefits associated with pensions can be very het-
erogeneous. The same holds for pension guaran-
tee schemes that cause non-linearities in the
relation between pension liabilities and company
value.
Finally, the pronounced differences in funding
levels may also influence the results of value- (or
credit-) relevance studies. The US-based study by
Coronado and Sharpe (2003) indicates that in-
vestors put more emphasis on the income effects
of US companies’ pension schemes than on pen-
sion assets and pension liabilities (see also
Coronado et al., 2008). Coronado and Sharpe be-
lieve their finding points to irrational earnings 
fixation of investors who are fooled by smoothed
and, hence, seemingly persistent pension-induced
earnings components. As noted, in some
Continental European countries defined benefit
pension plans tend to be strongly underfunded.
Hence, most companies in these countries do not
report positive pension income. Furthermore,
when funding levels are low, companies have
much less leeway to smooth, or otherwise influ-
ence, pension income through expected returns on
plan assets. Moreover, one would expect that in-
vestors are concerned about the financial risk the
often very substantial net pension liabilities pose
for companies’ long-term stability. For these rea-
sons, it appears reasonable to expect that in coun-
tries with low funding levels balance sheet pension
information plays a more important role in the val-
uation of companies than pension income informa-
tion. The above-mentioned study by Fasshauer and
Glaum (2008) provides support for this line of ar-
guments. However, further research is required to
investigate in more depth the value-relevance of
pension accounting information in low-funding
countries or, more generally, in different institu-
tional environments.
6. Summary and opportunities for further
research
This paper provides a review of empirical research
on pension accounting. A number of empirical
studies investigate the value-relevance of pension
accounting information. Taken together, the results
from this line of research indicate that reported
pension accounting information is reflected in
both share prices and in bond ratings and bond
spreads, suggesting that it is informative to equity
and debt investors. Results on the relative merits
of fair-value pension measures and smoothed pen-
sion measures are not fully conclusive. However,
there are indications that fair-value measures of
pension assets and liabilities within the balance
sheet may be more informative to investors than
measures that are smoothed with the ‘corridor ap-
proach’ that was previously allowed under FAS 87
and still is allowed under IAS 19. This supports re-
cent changes in US GAAP, and similar plans of the
IASB, which have made full recognition of com-
panies’ pension obligations in the balance sheet
mandatory.
With regard to the income statement, studies in-
dicate that recurring pension cost components –
service costs, interest costs, returns on plan assets
– are systematically associated with stock market
valuations, whereas the much more volatile fair-
value changes of pension assets and liabilities are
not. This highlights that further changes of US
GAAP or IFRS pension accounting standards that
concern the presentation of actuarial gains and
losses need to be coordinated with the FASB’s and
IASB’s project on financial statement presenta-
tion. In order to be decision-useful, it is important
that persistent and transitory components of pen-
sion costs are reported separately in the statement
of income from transitory components.
A second focal point of the empirical pension ac-
counting research are studies on managerial dis-
cretion and earnings management. Managers have
scope for discretion, in particular, when setting ac-
tuarial assumptions. Findings from research sug-
gest that managers exercise this discretion in
opportunistic ways. Managerial choices regarding
pension accounting appear to be influenced by fi-
nancing constraints, tax benefits, companies’ ef-
forts to smooth earnings, political and regulatory
costs, as well as managerial self-interest.
Results from further studies suggest that stock
markets are not fully efficient with regard to pen-
sion accounting information. Analysts and in-
vestors seem to have difficulties processing the
relatively complex information about changes in
US companies’ pension positions, in particular in-
formation that is not recognised but only disclosed
in the notes to financial statements. Finally, empir-
ical studies on the effects of managerial discretion
on the value-relevance of pension accounting ar-
Vol. 39 No. 3 2009 International Accounting Policy Forum. 305
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rive at partly conflicting and inconclusive results.
This review is an attempt to aggregate and criti-
cally evaluate what we can learn from extant em-
pirical research on pension accounting. Looking
ahead, what are the issues and questions that future
research should focus on? I believe the question
whether fair-value measures or smoothed, longer-
term actuarial measures are more decision-useful
to investors and other users of financial statements
will continue to be of central importance to the
field of pension accounting. As mentioned, results
of previous studies on this point are not fully 
consistent and further research is required.
Furthermore, given that full recognition of compa-
nies’ pension obligations in the balance sheet has
become mandatory under US GAAP, and will like-
ly become mandatory under IFRS, it would be in-
teresting to develop research strategies, for
instance, based on experiments, that would allow
to assess the decision-usefulness of alternative
forms of presentation of valuation changes in com-
prehensive income.
Further opportunities for research in pension ac-
counting follow from the fact that extant research is
almost exclusively based on US data. As I have
shown in the preceding section, it is not a given that
US-based research can be generalised to other 
institutional environments. Hence, it would be 
interesting to analyse which effects national or re-
gional differences in, for instance, pension regula-
tion, taxation and funding, have on the production
of pension accounting information by preparers,
and on the processing of this information by 
analysts, investors and other users. As discussed
above, it is likely that such differences lead to dif-
ferent incentives, and different limitations, for
earnings management, and they may also influence
the value-relevance of pension accounting informa-
tion in different countries or regions of the world.
As for other areas of accounting, the transition of
thousands of companies from their respective local
accounting standards to IFRS in Europe, and in
other countries across the world, opens up oppor-
tunities for empirical research on pension account-
ing. For instance, it would be interesting to look
into the ways companies exercise options when
adopting IFRS and implementing IAS 19 for the
first time (also see IFRS 1, para. 20). It would also
be of interest to compare the value-relevance of
pension accounting amounts previously reported
under national GAAP with those reported under
IFRS, or the incremental value-relevance of pen-
sion-related transition amounts (Horton and
Serafeim, 2008).53
Finally, one can observe that previous studies on
pension accounting, at least studies published in
high-level academic journals, have applied only a
limited range of methods. I believe it would be
very valuable for research to gain a deeper under-
standing of how decisions on recognition, valua-
tion and disclosure with respect to corporate
pensions are actually taken in reality, i.e., how
company management, pension fund managers
and trustees, actuaries, and auditors interact, when
and where possible conflicts arise, and how much
scope managers actually have to pursue possible
earnings management goals. By the same token, it
would be interesting to understand better how pen-
sion accounting information is processed in reality
by analysts, investors, and other interested parties.
Value-relevance studies and other studies based on
archival data can only provide indirect answers to
these questions. Thus, it would be interesting and
helpful to complement these currently dominant
forms of research with other methods, such as sur-
vey studies, clinical studies, or experiments.
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